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Abstract: This research addresses the fundamental question of whether providing a 
safe workplace improves or hinders organizational survival, because there are 15 
conflicting predictions on the relationship between worker safety and organizational 
performance. The results, based on a unique longitudinal database covering over 
100,000 organizations across 25 years in the U.S. state of Oregon, indicate that in 
general organizations that provide a safe workplace have significantly lower odds and 
length of survival. Additionally, the organizations that would in general have better 20 
survival odds, benefit most from not providing a safe workplace. This suggests that 
relying on the market does not engender workplace safety.   
 
Introduction 
The pursuit of profit can lead to job creation, innovation, and enhanced prosperity. 25 
But when organizations cannot or will not provide a safe workplace, there are costs to 
workers and society. This research exploits unique longitudinal data to address a 
fundamental question: Does providing a safe workplace improve or hinder 
organizational survival?   
We address this question because there are conflicting predictions on the relationship 30 between worker safety and organizational performance, making it difficult to provide coherent policy recommendations or create effective safety regulation. Safety regulation and policy are intended to prevent harm at work. But the implications for regulation 
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and policy if it is profitable to provide a safe workplace are very different than if it is 
more profitable not to provide a safe workplace.  
Managerial research posits that improving worker safety and wellbeing will improve 
profits (e.g. Pagell et al., 2015; Gubler et al., 2018). The argument that a safer 
workplace will increase profits is as follows. Building and leveraging human capital 5 
to develop unique capabilities is a key enabler for creating long-term competitive 
advantage (e.g. Becker 1993; Hatch and Dyer, 2004). When the work environment is 
not safe, human capital is being harmed, not built. Workers in unsafe environments 
engage in self-protection and are not motivated to improve the organization’s 
operations (Das et al., 2008). However, workers in safe environments do not have to 10 
dedicate resources to self-protection and can be motivated to engage in improving the 
organization’s operations; safety provides a necessary condition to leverage human 
capital into the development of unique capabilities and long-term competitive 
advantage (Das et al., 2008). Organizations that harm their human capital cannot build 
these capabilities and will be less likely to survive. This suggests that market 15 
mechanisms alone should eliminate poor safety.  
However, classical economics suggest that safety regulation exists because 
organizations would not provide a safe workplace on their own volition. The 
supposition that regulation that provides a communal good (in this case a safe 
workforce) is burdensome or costly for employers is often referred to as the ‘costly 20 
regulation hypothesis’ (Palmer et al., 1995; Levine et al., 2012).  
The literature on occupational safety is generally in line with the costly regulation 
hypothesis, with some safety researchers positing that organizations make trade-offs 
between being safe and being productive (e.g. Das et al., 2008; Zohar, 2008). The 
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safety literature notes that a key way to increase productivity is by producing more 
output from the same workers. As the pace of work increases and buffers or slack 
decrease, productivity increases, but so does the likelihood of accidents and other 
harm to workers (Diwas and Terwiesch, 2009; Kuntz et al., 2015; Wiengarten et al., 
2017).  5 
From this perspective, organizations that do not provide a safe workplace gain an 
economic advantage by avoiding burdensome costs and being more productive, which 
may explain why even proponents of “it pays to be safe” provide evidence that 
numerous organizations are not safe (Pagell et al., 2015). Similarly, many 
organizations have accidents and harm their workers without being sanctioned by 10 
regulators (BLS, 2019b). And, organizations that do get inspected could conclude that 
the fines for non-compliance are miniscule (Bradbury, 2006). If there are incentives 
for organizations to ignore safety, then market mechanisms alone will not eliminate 
poor safety. 
The veracity of the costly regulation hypothesis has been the subject of much debate 15 
and empirical study in economics since Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
controversially claimed that well designed environmental regulations increase 
innovation, offsetting the costs of regulation and increasing profitability. This 
prediction finds limited support, but the debate continues (Rassier and Earnhart, 2015; 
Earnhart and Rassier, 2016). The same debate is salient to safety regulation. Levine et 20 
al. (2012) found that inspections (regulatory oversight) decrease accidents in the 
short-term, while not affecting organization survival. However, the research linking 
regulation to improved safety indicates that the impact of an inspection is short-term 
and that inspections do not improve safety in the long-term (Haviland et al., 2012; 
Tompa et al., 2016). Similarly, research also indicates that when inspections do not 25 
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lead to sanctions, the likelihood of future accidents either stays the same (Tompa et 
al., 2016) or increases (Scholz & Gray, 1997). Finally, with a few exceptions such as 
Levine et al. (2012), studies of the effectiveness of safety regulation only focus on 
safety outcomes, not profits or survival.  
Similarly, many studies in the managerial literature linking workplace safety to 5 
improved organizational performance have been hamstrung by cross-sectional 
analyses, small and biased samples, and poor proxies. For instance, the sample in 
Pagell et al. (2015) was limited to manufacturing facilities with at least 100 
employees, when most organizations are much smaller and not engaged in 
manufacturing (BLS, 2019c). While there is compelling evidence to support the 10 
perspective of either the costly regulation hypothesis or the managerial literature 
concluding it pays to be safe, neither is conclusive.  
We further this discussion by directly exploring organizational survival and safety 
outcomes across 25 years of quarterly data on all organizations in the U.S. state of 
Oregon. Directly exploring safety is important for two reasons. First, many 15 
organizations have accidents and harm their workers without facing regulatory 
sanctions (BLS, 2019b). Second, worker safety, not regulatory compliance is both the 
desired outcome of regulation and what leads to the development of human capital or 
unique capabilities (Pagell et al., 2015). Our data include the cost of all safety-related 
claims for each organization, as well as its entry date and how long it survived. 20 
Additionally, the data allow us to explore the role of contextual factors such as 
industry, and an organization’s size, age, output-per-worker and growth. Our research 
explores these competing predictions in the context of modern regulations:  
1. Providing a safe workplace increases organizational survival, in line with the 
managerial literature on safety.  25 
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2. Providing a safe workplace reduces organizational survival, in line with the 
costly regulation hypothesis. 
 
We perform separate analyses to examine short and long-term survival because it is 
possible that the relationship between workplace safety and organizational survival 5 
depends on the time horizon. Short-term survival, survival in the immediate future, 
may be enhanced by not taking on the costs of providing a safe-workplace; for 
instance by decreasing costs by eliminating safety training. However, over the long-
term, the same organizational conduct could increase the severity and frequency of 
claims and destroy rather than build human capital.  10 
The results of both analyses are consistent with the costly regulation hypothesis. In 
general, organizations significantly decrease their odds and length of survival by 
providing a safe workplace. This effect is most pronounced for organizations that are 
older, larger and/or have zero to moderate levels of growth. Organizations that are 
young, small, and or are growing at a negative or fast rate, gain the least from having 15 
claims and are most likely to see high claims costs harm survival. These findings 
suggest that relying on the market to make workplaces safe is inadequate and that 
current regulations do not achieve their aims, because they are not sufficiently 
incentivizing organizations to protect their workers.   
Data and Methods 20 
Oregon has a diversified economy with a mix of natural resources, agriculture, 
manufacturing, services and high technology (SOS, 2019). The State’s safety 
regulations have met or exceeded U.S. federal guideline since being approved in 1982 
(OSHA, 2019b), before the beginning of our data. The Oregon Department of 
Consumer and Business Services (DCBS), which administers laws and rules 25 
governing workplace safety and health in Oregon, provided data on the cost of all 
6  
disabling claims made in the state from 1989-2014. Disabling claims are those where 
a worker suffers temporary disability, defined as requiring three or more days off 
work, or the expectation of permanent disability1.  
DCBS also provided employment data for all organizations operating in Oregon, 
which originally came from the BLS’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 5 
(QCEW). The QCEW compiles quarterly employment and wage data for 8.9 million 
U.S. organizations, representing 98% of non-farm, payroll organizations (BLS, 
2019c). While this data is publicly available in aggregate form, individual 
organizational records are not publicly available due to privacy concerns (BLS, 
2019a). DCBS provided unique IDs allowing us to anonymously link the QCEW and 10 
claims data. 
The population included 386,179 organizations with establishments in the state 
between 1989 and 2014. Two samples of organizations with over 5 employees at 
some point in their lifetime and sufficient data were constructed. For the short-term 
analysis, a sample (ST sample) of 103,906 organizations was available; for the long-15 
term analysis, a sample (LT sample) of 122,570 organizations was available. The 
appendix provides additional detail on the data and the composition of each sample.  
While individual worker behaviors lead to some accidents, the literature shows that 
the systems, climate and culture that an organization creates and maintains have a 
large influence on worker behaviors and the likelihood of accidents (Christian et al., 20 
2009; Clark, 2013). Hence, we treat providing a safe workplace as an organizational 
responsibility. We operationalize providing a safe workplace based on an 
                                                             1 DCBS did not provide data on fatalities because these are very rare events (BLS 
2019b).  For instance, from 2010-2014 there were 136 fatalities in Oregon (CBS 
2019a) and 93,721 disabling claims (CBS 2019b) 
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organization’s short and long-term cost of claims history, both because cost is a good 
proxy for the severity of a claim (Lebeau et al., 2014) and because as costs go up 
either the claims are more numerous and/or more severe. A count of claims is less 
refined and does not capture severity. However, because the distribution of claims is 
highly skewed, the robustness checks also explore two alternative operationalizations 5 
of providing a safe workplace; a count of claims and the presence of claim(s) vs. no 
claims.  
For the short-term analysis, the independent variable is short-term claims costs 
(STCC) and the dependent variable is risk of failure in the current quarter. For the 
long-term analysis the independent variable is long-term claims cost (LTCC) and the 10 
dependent variable is time-to-failure. Because there is evidence that the relationship 
between social and economic performance could be non-linear (e.g. Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006; Lioui and Sharma, 2012) we explore both the linear and non-linear 
relationship between claims costs and failure. Controls were growth, output-per-
worker, employee turnover, industry, organization age, employment, year and quarter 15 
of entry, year and quarter of claim. The appendix provides additional detail on 
measurement.    
STCC were captured in each quarter as a time varying covariate. Defined as the mean 
cost of claims per 100 workers per quarter per organization in the past two years, 
STCC was log transformed due to extreme positive skew. STCC was top-coded at the 20 
99th percentile to reduce the influence of very large claims (e.g. Levine et al., 2012; 
Elfenbein et al., 2010).  Mean STCC after top-coding was $ 4,264 (SD= $ 16,014), or 
1.95 (SD=3.71) log STCC. 
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LTCC was calculated as mean claims costs per 100 workers per quarter, across the 
portion of an organization’s lifetime in the data (between 1989 and 2014). LTCC was 
log transformed and top-coded in the same manner as STCC. Mean LTCC after top-
coding was $4,575(SD= $13,284), or 3.16 (SD=4.13) log LTCC.  
The literature on organizational survival and failure is vast but disjointed (e.g. Josefy 5 
et al., 2017). Failure or survival has been operationalized multiple ways including 
ongoing operations, solvency or bankruptcy, or continuity of ownership (e.g. Josefy et 
al., 2017). We follow the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and define survival as 
ongoing operations (Sadeghi, 2008) even in the face of an ownership change. Failure 
occurs when operations cease. This definition posits that management (as opposed to 10 
ownership), technology, and the operational workforce remain if operations continue. 
In addition, because the literature suggests that both characteristics of the competitive 
environment and the organization impact an organization’s likelihood of failure (e.g. 
Knaup and Piazza, 2007) we address both in the analysis.  
To examine the effects of STCC on risk of failure in the current quarter, organizations 15 
were dummy coded as “failed” or “ongoing” in each quarter. To examine the effects 
of LTCC on time-to-failure in quarters, survival was calculated as exit time minus 
entry time in quarters. To distinguish between organizations that failed and those that 
were still in operation in the last quarter of the data, organizations were dummy coded 
as “failed” or “ongoing” at the last time point of the QCEW dataset (2014 quarter 4). 20 
Organizational growth has been shown to be associated with increases in 
organizational survival (Philips & Kirchloff, 1989) and occupational accident rates 
(Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2018). Therefore, we included organizational growth as a 
control variable in the models. Short-term growth was operationalized as the mean 
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quarterly change in employment for the previous two years. Long-term growth was 
operationalized as the mean quarterly change in employment from entry to exit. 
Moderate organizational growth was anticipated to be positively associated with 
survival, but very high growth has been argued to be negatively associated with 
organizational survival (Sterman et al., 2007); hence we control for the polynomial 5 
effect of growth.   
The safety literature and safety regulation assume that as workers produce more, they 
have greater exposure to risk (Zohar, 2008). Similarly, increases in working hours, 
especially overtime working hours, also increase workers’ risk exposure (Dembe et 
al., 2005). However, increased output-per-worker is also associated with an increased 10 
likelihood of organizational survival (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982). Furthermore, while 
working more hours may not be an indication of being busier, working fewer hours or 
not being busy would reduce organizational survival. Because we do not have data 
that directly measures production, hours worked or sales, we coarsely control for 
these factors by including wages-per-employee (relative to industry mean) as a proxy 15 
for output-per-worker.  
Increased turnover of workers is associated with poorer organizational performance 
(e.g. Koys, 2001) and increased harm to workers, because new hires are more likely to 
get injured (e.g. Khanzode et al., 2012; Burt, 2016).  While we do not have a direct 
measure of turnover, we included the standard deviation of employment per quarter as 20 
a proxy for turnover. Both output-per-worker and turnover were calculated over the 
past two years for the short-term analysis, and across the lifetime of the organization 
for the long-term analysis. The remaining controls are described in the appendix.    
Analysis and results 
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We examined the relationship between log STCC and risk of failure in the current 
quarter employing the ST sample (103,906 organizations / 4,046,312 observations) 
using a conditional cox proportional hazards model that deals with left truncation 
(Guo, 1993; Yang and Aldrich, 2012). Primary results are in Table 1 and Figs. 1 and 
2, with full results, including control variables in supplement Table S3. The 5 
relationship is non-linear (u-shaped); hazard may be predicted as -0.0852 (0.0071) log 
STCC + 0.0079 (7e-04) log STCC2. The model significantly predicted hazard, χ2 
(125)= 84907.   
Increases in STCC (log STCC + log STCC2) are associated with a reduction in 
quarterly risk of failure by up to 20.52 % (10.98 %, 29.28 %)2 relative to an 10 
organization with zero STCC (Fig. 1; Table 2)3. The largest reduced risk of failure 
occurs above the 75th percentile of log STCC, and claims do not relate to a predicted 
increased risk of failure until they reach the 90th percentile of log STCC. For an 
organization with 100 employees, the 90th percentile corresponds to more than 3.45 
mean-sized claims per quarter (Table 2).  15 
The predictions in the managerial literature are premised on building and then 
leveraging human capital (Das et al., 2008; Pagell et al., 2015) which takes time 
(Becker, 1993). Hence, we also examined whether long-term claims costs predict time 
to organizational failure.  Specifically, we perform a set of linear regression analyses 
on the LT sample (122,570 organizations). Primary results are in Table 3 and Fig. 3. 20 
The results are similar to the short-term analysis. Increased log LTCC is associated 
with increased time to failure and the effect is non-linear (inverse u-shaped). 
                                                             2 Results reported in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals unless otherwise noted 3 We use organizations with zero STCC as the comparison for all analysis because this was the most common outcome, claims costs (or counts) cannot go below zero forming a natural minimum and most importantly this is the goal of policy and regulation. 
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Increasing log LTCC (log LTCC + log LTCC2) is associated with an increase in 
survival of up to 22.05 (20.19, 23.92 ) quarters (Table 3 Main Effect; Table 4; Fig. 
3A),  representing a 56% longer lifespan relative to the mean lifespan of 39.59 
quarters. The greatest increase in time to failure occurs above the 65th percentile of 
log LTCC, and claims do not relate to decreased time to failure until they reach the 5 
90th percentile of log LTCC: an organization with 100 employees could have up to 
22.86 mean-sized claims per quarter before their time to failure was less than an 
organization with zero claims (Table 4).  
To further explore the results, we ran analyses with subsets of the data. Specifically, 
we created groups by size, growth, industry, turnover, and output-per-worker in both 10 
the short and long-term models. We did the same for age in the short-term models. 
We did not create age groupings for the long-term models, because the dependent 
variable for the long-term models is time to failure / length of survival.  
Z-tests were used to test whether the coefficients for the different groups were 
significantly different from each other for the given variables. The z-tests made it 15 
possible to determine if the benefits from increased claims costs; in terms of reducing 
risk of failure (ST analysis - Tables S4-6) or increasing time to failure (LT analysis- 
Tables S8-10), differed significantly by group. For groups where effects differed 
significantly (according to a z-test) and consistently, we discuss the differences 
between the curves.  20 
We report the results for age, size and growth in the paper’s main body. Age provides 
additional insight into the short-term models while size and growth are consistent 
across the short and long-term in an insightful manner. The results for industry, 
turnover and output-per-worker are not reported in the main body because while there 
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are some significant differences between groups, there are no clear patterns. Please 
refer to the supplement (pages 3-8) for the full results.  
The reduced risk of failure associated with increased STCC is amplified with age 
(Table 1 Age; Fig. 2A; Table S4). Younger organizations benefit less from having 
claims and are more susceptible to large claims harming survival (Table 2). For 5 
example, the youngest organizations (3-7 years) benefit from STCC only up to 
$7,130, compared to $48,280 for all organizations or $157,776 for organizations 
between 23 and 27 years old.  
The reduced risk of failure due to increased claims is also amplified with 
organizational size4 for both STCC (Table 1 Size; Fig. 2B; Table S4) and LTCC 10 
(Table 2 Size; Fig. 3B; Table S10). In the short-term, the smaller organizations (6-10 
and 10-30 workers) get no or minimal benefits from claims, while the largest 
organizations (over 100) benefit from having claims up until STCC reaches 
$9,042,459 (Table 2). In the long-term the smaller organizations (6-10 and 10-30) 
reap significantly lower benefits from having claims relative to the larger 15 
organizations (30-100, > 100) and the larger organizations see benefits from LTCC 
until they reach extremely high levels (Table 4).  
The results for growth in the short-term (Table 1 Growth; Fig 2C; Table S4) and long-
term (Table 3, Growth; Table 4; Fig 3C; Table S10) provide important insight. In both 
the short and long-term, the organizations that see the greatest benefit from increased 20 
claims costs are those that have zero to moderate levels of growth (quartile 3) while 
                                                             4 Because we excluded organizations that never reached 6 employees, we do not discuss the results for observations where the organization had less than 6 employees.  This is because only organizations that at one time had six or more employees would be included in this group, making interpretation difficult and inconsistent with other size groupings. Please see the appendix for more details.   
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those with the most negative growth (quartile 1) gain few if any benefits from 
increased claims. Interestingly, the organizations growing the fastest (quartile 4) are 
most susceptible to very large claims harming survival.  
The results indicate that on average an increase in claims costs is associated with an 
increase in survival. This effect is amplified for older and larger organizations as well 5 
as for organizations that have zero to moderate levels of growth. On the contrary, 
organizations already facing greater survival risks, those that are young, have few 
employees, and or have negative or fast growth, are most likely to see high levels of 
claims harm survival.  
A number of additional analyses were conducted to test alternative explanations for 10 
the results (Table 5). These analyses show that the results are robust to alternative 
operationalizations of providing a safe workplace, the analytical approach, the choice 
of time lag, the exclusion criteria used to create the samples, the form of the 
relationship between claims costs and failure, and the operationalizations of industry 
and failure.  15 
Discussion  
The research asked if providing a safe workplace improved or hindered organizational 
survival. The results indicate that providing a safe workplace generally hindered 
organizational survival, in line with the costly regulation hypothesis. Organizations 
with claims survive longer than their peers without claims. This effect is magnified 20 
for organizations that are older, larger and or that have zero to moderate levels of 
growth; those that already have the best survival prospects (e.g. Knaup and Piazza, 
2007). These organizations are most likely to have the resources to dedicate to 
protecting the workforce and will have the least incentive to do so.  
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Similarly, organizations facing more precarious survival prospects, organizations that 
are young, small or facing other risks due to negative or fast growth (e.g. Knaup and 
Piazza, 2007), gain the least from having claims and are most likely to see high claims 
costs harm survival. These organizations, that may have an incentive to protect the 
workforce, will be least likely to have the resources to do so.  5 
In the United States OSHA was created “to ensure safe and healthful working 
conditions for working men and women” (OSHA, 2019a) while the mission of the 
HSE in the United Kingdom is to “prevent work-related death, injury and ill health” 
(HSE, 2019). Both are aligned with the occupational health and safety conventions of 
the International Labour Organization (the United Nation’s agency that sets labor 10 
standards and policies) which have been adopted by 68 countries; these conventions 
have prevention as the ultimate goal (ILO, 2019). Safety regulation and policy are 
intended to prevent harm at work. Yet the results predict that for most organizations 
enhanced survival will conflict with the goal of protecting the workforce. Market 
mechanisms alone will not eliminate poor safety and our results imply that the 15 
regulations of a developed economy are not enough to incent the elimination of poor 
safety. 
The data set is both the key strength and key limitation of the research. The dataset 
captures almost all organizations that engaged in economic activity in the state of 
Oregon over 25 years, but the dataset provides no information on actual managerial 20 
practices. Hence, the analysis is predictive not explanatory. Still the analysis does 
provide some direction both to start to explain the results and to guide future research.  
First, the analysis directly addressed many of the potential alternative explanations for 
the results. Most of the characteristics of the competitive environment or the 
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organization that the literature suggests could impact survival or having claims were 
controlled or tested. The analysis controls for industry (e.g. Knaup and Piazza, 2007) 
and economic conditions (e.g. Geroski et al, 2010); the later through year dummies. 
The regulatory and political environment (e.g. Hiatt et al., 2014) also impacts survival 
and was controlled for by having data from a single U.S. state. At the organizational 5 
level; growth, productivity, turnover, size, and age (e.g. Ohlson, 1980; Knaup and 
Piazza, 2007) have all been linked to both survival and accidents and all were 
controlled for in the analysis. In addition, the robustness checks suggest that the 
results are not due to the operationalization of providing a safe workplace, the 
analytical approach, or if the timeframe is short, medium or long-term. 10 
However, there is a considerable body of literature that examines survival based on 
financial indicators such as debt and cash flow (e.g. Keener, 2013). Similarly, issues 
such as board composition (e.g. Bermis et al., 2015) and managerial background (e.g. 
Chadwick et al., 2016) have also been linked to survival.  Given our data we could not 
control for these factors, which is a limitation that future research will need to 15 
address.  
Another area to explore is alternative measures of providing a safe workplace. While 
near misses and minor accidents have been linked to future severe accidents in the 
safety literature (Manuele, 2011), the links are tenuous (Bellamy, 2015; Manuele, 
2011; Marshall et al., 2018). Exploring only disabling claims, which are quite severe 20 
hopefully eliminated the noise from minor incidents and allowed us to target only 
serious harm to workers. In addition, with minor accidents, under-reporting is a 
possibility (Pransky et al., 1999). This is much less likely with disabling claims, 
relative to non-disabling claims due to their severity. The wide range of medical and 
non-medical costs associated with these claims needs to be paid, typically by an 25 
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insurance company for the organizations in this data, which can only occur if the 
claims are reported. Hence, worker compensation databases are viewed as providing a 
robust measure of work injuries (Oleinick & Zaidman, 2004). Future research needs 
to test this supposition by exploring the same questions with alternative measures of 
providing a safe workplace, which could include fatalities, both disabling and non-5 
disabling claims, near misses, and regulatory sanctions.  
 
The data does not allow the level of detail required to explain the mechanism that 
makes having claims generally superior for organizational survival. We can say that 
our results do not support the prediction that providing a safe workplace will enhance 10 
competitiveness. This does not mean that there are not organizations that can 
simultaneously provide a safe workplace and improve their competitiveness, as has 
been documented in the literature (e.g. Pagell et al., 2015), but it does mean that such 
organizations are not the norm. Consistent with the costly regulation hypothesis we 
posit that many organizations approach safety management from the standpoint of 15 
minimizing the cost of being in compliance with regulation. These organizations have 
fewer accidents than those who are out of compliance; some even have none. But 
viewing safety as a cost to be minimized rather than an opportunity to build human 
capital, means they cannot leverage protecting the workforce into other capabilities 
(e.g. Das et al., 2008). Similarly, from the perspective of the costly regulation 20 
hypothesis they have taken on the costs of compliance, while some competitors with 
accidents seemingly have not. In other words, treating compliance as a cost, and 
trying to comply, is more expensive than not complying and having accidents. 
However, this approach does not build any of the capabilities that theory (though not 
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our results) suggests could offset these costs. This is speculative and needs to be 
explored in future research.  
Finally, future research needs to focus on testing the effectiveness of policies and 
regulations that incentivize organizations to protect their workforce. Pagell and 
Gobeli (2009) found two paths to high operational performance. The first group with 5 
high operational performance minimized their harm to workers and the environment. 
However, there was a second group of organizations with high operational 
performance that effectively ignored or externalized their harm to workers and the 
environment. Pagell and Gobeli (2009) concluded that future research needed to 
explore if the gains from externalizing this harm to workers and the environment was 10 
short lived.  
The current research suggests not. It provides clear evidence that many organizations 
are presently benefiting in the short and long-term from externalizing their costs of 
poor safety on society. For safety regulators and policy makers to achieve their goal 
of preventing harm to workers they need to create incentives that reward the 15 
organizations who are safe and productive. Organizations seeking to maximize their 
own survival are unlikely to intentionally harm workers. But our results indicate that 
they are, on average, also correct in concluding that the costs of preventing all harm is 
higher than the costs of not doing so. In addition, the organizations most likely to 
have the resources to dedicate to protecting their workforce, currently have the least 20 
incentive to do so.  Hence, we paraphrase Porter and van der Linde (1995) and 
suggest that future safety regulation and policy needs to be crafted and enforced in a 
manner that rewards innovations that simultaneously improve the safety of the 
workforce and the organization’s likelihood of survival. 
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Appendix 
Data 
The data provided by the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services 
(DCBS) come from organizations with workers covered by state unemployment 
insurance (UI) laws and federal workers covered by the Unemployment 5 
Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. Any organization that: 
a. pays $1,000 or more to employees in a calendar quarter; 
b.  pays $20,000 or more in cash wages in a calendar quarter and employs 
agricultural workers; or 
c. has 10 or more employees in each of 20 weeks during a calendar year 10 
is required to pay unemployment insurance (Oregon Employment Department, 2017). 
While these data are publicly available in aggregate form, individual organizational 
records are not publicly available due to privacy concerns (BLS, 2018b).  
The claims and QCEW datasets allowed us identify organizations using unique IDs to 
preserve anonymity. Matching these datasets allowed us to examine the effects of 15 
claims costs on organizational failure and length of survival.  In our original sample, 
9.21% of organizations had multiple establishments in the state of Oregon in their 
lifetime, but we treat them as a single organization. As our data only cover 
establishments in the state, we are unaware of whether employers have out-of-state 
establishments, a limitation of the dataset. 20 
Samples 
The population (based on QCEW data, which cover all organizations, even those 
without claims) totaled 386,179 organizations with Oregon operations between 1989 
and 2014. We created separate subsamples for the short-term (ST sample) and long-
term (LT sample) analyses. We used the following elimination criteria to create both 25 
sub-samples:  
1. Organizations that never employed more than five workers at a time, in 
their lifetime (64.61% of original population).  
2. Government (state, local or federal) organizations (.35% of original 
population); government employers do not experience the same 30 
competitive pressures as business and other non-governmental 
organizations. 
3. Organizations with an invalid industry (NAICS) code (.13% of original 
population).   
In addition, to examine the effect of short-term claims costs (STCC) on risk of 35 
organizational failure, organizations with fewer than two years of records in the 
QCEW (8.02% of original population) were eliminated to construct the ST sample; 
the measure constructed to assess short-term claims costs requires at least two years 
of data. The ST sample consisted of 103,906 organizations, with a total of 4,046,312 
observations (quarter-organizations); 3,128,095 of which do not have claims 40 
(77.31%). Observations without claims were kept for the analysis. Descriptive 
statistics and correlations for the ST sample are in Table A1.  
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To examine the effect of long-term claims costs (LTCC) on time to organizational 
failure (length of organizational survival), organizations with only one quarter in the 
QCEW (3.17% of original population) were eliminated to construct the LT sample; a 
minimum of two quarters is needed for the long-term analysis.  The LT sample 
consisted of 122,570 organizations, with a total of 122,570 observations 5 
(organizations), 75,084 of which do not have claims (61.26%). Observations without 
claims were kept for the analysis. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the LT 
sample are in Table A2. 
The first elimination criterion means that both samples excluded organizations that 
never exceeded 5 employees, while maintaining organizations that at any point were 10 
very small (<5), but at some point had 6 or more employees. Hence, in the short-term 
analysis there were many observations with 1-5 employees. But these are only for 
organizations that exceeded 5 employees at some point in their lifetime, they exclude 
organizations that never exceeded 5 employees. Similarly, the long-term analysis 
included organizations whose average employment over their lifetime was less than 6, 15 
but which exceeded 5 for at least one quarter. Hence, when discussing the results for 
small organizations, we exclude organizations with less than 5 employees. This 
subsample of the smallest organizations only includes those that grew to more than 5 
employees at some point in their lifetime and therefore is incomplete making 
interpretation difficult and not consistent with other size groupings. The robustness 20 
checks (Table 5 and Supplement p 20-22) indicate that this exclusion criterion did not 
drive the results.  
In some quarters the claims rate calculation was impossible because of  missing 
values for employment (.16%  of all organization-quarters), or cases where an 
organization had a claim but had zero employees (.06% of all organization-quarters), 25 
or cases where an organization reported wages paid but zero employees (.25% of all 
organization-quarters). For these observations, the number of employees was imputed 
based on employment in preceding and/or subsequent quarters.  
Operationalizing ongoing operations and potential sampling bias 
We operationalize survival as ongoing operations, even in the face of an ownership 30 
change. We define organizational exit (when operations cease) as the year of the last 
record of an organization in the QCEW dataset, consistent with definitions used in 
previous research (e.g. Mata et al., 1995; Phillips and Kirchloff 1989). An 
organization is assigned a new ID when it changes owners, legal status or industry. 
However the new and old IDs are linked across the datasets, allowing us to treat these 35 
as ongoing, not new organizations. This is in line with previous research (e.g. Knaup 
and Piazza, 2007), as well as the practice of the BLS, as they do not classify mergers 
or acquisitions (United States Census Bureau, 2017) or other changes in status, as 
exits (see Sadeghi, 2008).  
Exiting the dataset means that the last ID associated with an organization has left the 40 
dataset. In other words, exits are really exits rather than changes of ownership, legal 
status or industry. 19.98% of organizations in the ST sample, and 17.6% of 
organizations in the LT sample, have multiple IDs- indicating a change in legal entity, 
ownership or industry at some point in their history.   
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We compared our exit data with exit data from the US Census Business Dynamics 
Statistics (BDS), for the state of Oregon. We chose the BDS data because exit rates 
were available at the State level, whereas they were not available at the State level 
from the BLS. We compared exit rates between 1989 and 2013 because our data end 
2014, so all organizations are censored at that point.  Our exit rate is slightly above 5 
that of the BDS’ reported rate for the state of Oregon for the period (United States 
Census Bureau, 2017). Specifically, our annual mean exit rates average 1.5% higher 
than those reported by the census bureau (with a range from 4.65% above (1990) to 
1.95% below (2006). 
The small difference may arise because the Census Bureau data derives from 10 
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) data, whereas our data come from the QCEW. 
The LBD are constructed from the Census Bureau's Business Register, based on 
survey and administrative data, whereas the QCEW is based on unemployment 
insurance data. Further, the census bureau data uses several smoothing algorithms to 
account for processing delays.  15 
It is possible that some of this difference could be due to organizations closing their 
establishments in Oregon but remaining in business elsewhere. Given the small 
difference between our exit rate and that from other sources, we argue that that is not 
a major concern. And, it does not seem likely that out-of-state organizations would 
systematically close their safer operations, which would be necessary to bias our 20 
results. Finally, while mergers and acquisitions with entities outside of the state of 
Oregon could potentially account for some of the difference, announced 
mergers/acquisitions for the period of our data account for only 2.58% of total exits at 
the national level (Institute For Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, 2017). In sum, 
our treatment of exit, and our observed exit rate are in line with those reported 25 
elsewhere using the same or similar data, and we do not expect any bias due to 
treating multi-state entities closing their Oregon establishments as exits.  
Short-term analysis: variable definitions 
To assess the effect of STCC on risk of failure, STCCs were captured at each time 
point (quarter) as a time-varying covariate (Fisher and Lin, 1999). For each 30 
organization-quarter, these were defined as the mean claims cost per 100 workers per 
quarter in the past two years; for instance, the mean claims costs of quarters 1-8 
would be used to predict risk of failure in quarter 9. STCC was log transformed due to 
extreme positive skew. To avoid losing 0 values in the transformation, a 1 was added 
prior to transformation. STCC was top coded at the 99th percentile to reduce the 35 
influence of very large claims (e.g. Levine et al., 2012; Elfenbein et al., 2010). Mean 
STCC after top coding was $4,263.68 (SD= $16,013.83); mean log STCC was 1.95 
(SD=3.71). The log mean does not convert directly to the dollar mean, because the 
mean of logged values is less influenced by high values than the mean of dollar 
values. Mean of dollar values was calculated as mean (exp(log STCC) -1)), while 40 
mean of log values was calculated as mean (log STCC).The mean claim cost was 
$13,910.0, thus an organization of 100 employees averaged .304 average-sized claims 
per quarter.   
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Organizations are considered to have entered the dataset on their first appearance in 
the QCEW data (e.g. Fisher and Lin, 1999; Knaup & Piazza, 2007; Mata et al., 1995; 
Phillips and Kirchoff, 1989). Organizations entering the dataset in the first quarter of 
the dataset (1989 quarter 1) may have been founded prior to entering the dataset and 
could be left truncated. To deal with left-truncated organizations, a conditional 5 
likelihood approach was adopted (Guo, 1993; Yang & Aldrich, 2012) using 
organizational age as start times.  
Age for organizations that entered the dataset in quarter 1 of 1989 was identified 
using the dates of initial liability (DOL) provided by the DCBS. The DOL is the point 
at which an establishment becomes liable for unemployment insurance. The QCEW 10 
dataset is based on unemployment insurance, thus the DOL provides the same 
information as first entry date. Organizations “exit” the dataset at their last record 
(Dunne et al., 1989; Phillips & Kirchoff, 1989). Age, in quarters, at time t was 
calculated as t - DOL. For example, consider an organization that enters the QCEW 
dataset in quarter 1 of 1989 with a DOL in quarter 1 of 1987. Age in quarter 2 of 1990 15 
may be calculated as 1990 Q2 - 1987 Q1= 13 quarters.   
Organizations exiting the dataset in the last quarter of the dataset (2014 quarter 4) 
were considered right censored. Organizations were considered to have “failed” at a 
given time point if they left the dataset for more than two consecutive quarters and did 
not return. To examine the effects of STCC on risk of organizational failure in the 20 
current quarter, organizations were dummy coded as “failed” or “ongoing”. 
Major industry group was included as a control variable because industries vary in 
their level of danger to workers (BLS, 2017) and likelihood of going out of business 
(Stearns et al., 1995). We use two-digit North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) 2012 codes to indicate major industry groups. Organizations 25 
initially classified using NAICS 2002, 2007, or Standard Industrial Classification 
1987 systems were converted into NAICS 2012. Each organizational was assigned a 
single NAICS 2012 code. For organizations that used multiple industry codes during 
their lifetime, one NAICS 2012 code was selected based on the highest employment 
level. Industry code was derived from QCEW data, as this contains the entire 30 
population. The referent category in the analysis was NAICS 54 (Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical Services) because this industry has the lowest STCC (mean 
of $2.68 STCC per 100 employees per quarter, SD=$4.23, N=7563).  
Mean employment per organization also was included as a control variable as larger 
organizations have more claims and are more likely to survive (Evans, 1987). To 35 
examine the effects of STCC on risk of failure, mean employment per organization 
per quarter in the last two years was included as a time-varying covariate. 
Growth also was included as a control variable because economic growth is 
associated with increases in organizational survival (Philips & Kirchloff, 1989) and 
occupational accident rates (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2018). To examine the impact of 40 
short-term growth (growth) on risk of failure, growth was captured at each time point 
(quarter) as a time-varying covariate (Fisher & Lin, 1999). Growth was defined in the 
short-term for each organization i in quarter t as the logarithmic difference in 
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employees from two years previous (Bird & Zellwegger, 2018; Daunfeldt & 
Halvarsson, 2015; Brush et al., 2000)A constant of .01 was added to employment at t 
and to employment at t-2 years, to avoid losing zero values prior to calculation. (Zero 
values are rare in this data). Logged growth was divided by 8, to provide a quarterly 
growth rate.  Growth was top coded at the 99th percentile and bottom coded at the 1st 5 
percentile to reduce the influence of extreme growth. Mean growth after top and 
bottom coding was -0.0033 (SD=0.1371).  
We include wages-per-employee (relative to industry average in each quarter) as a 
control variable; it serves as a proxy for output-per-worker. The economics literature 
indicates that wages and productivity are linked (e.g. Hellerstein et al., 1999; 10 
Haltiwangerer et al., 2007) and using wages as a proxy for productivity is common in 
health economics (e.g. Connolly et al., 2017). When an organization’s workers earn 
more than average, they are typically either more productive or working more hours; 
output-per-worker then should be higher. For the short-term analysis, this is 
calculated as the mean over the preceding 8 quarters, at each timepoint. Mean output-15 
per-worker was $7120.751 (SD=21796.96).  
We included the standard deviation of employment as a proxy for employee turnover, 
with the assumption that while some variance in employment could be due to seasonal 
fluctuations, more variance indicated an increased likelihood of hiring and firing and 
hence the presence of new workers. For the short-term analysis, this is calculated  as 20 
the mean over the preceding 8 quarters, at each timepoint. Mean turnover was 2.81 
(SD=5.46). 
To control for changes in the relative risk of starting a business over time, the entry 
year and quarter that each organization entered the QCEW dataset also was included 
as a covariate.  25 
To control for the overall business environment, as well as for changes in legislation 
that might affect claims costs over time, each time-point (each quarter between 
quarter 1 of 1989 and quarter 4 of 2014) was dummy-coded and included as a 
covariate.  
Long-term Analysis: variable definitions 30 
To test the effect of long-term claims cost (LTCC) on time to failure, LTCC was 
calculated as mean claims costs per 100 workers per quarter per organization, 
calculated across the lifetime of each organization. Long-term claims cost was log 
transformed due to extreme positive skew. To avoid losing 0 values in the 
transformation, 1 was added prior to transformation. LTCC was top coded at the 99th 35 
percentile to reduce the influence of extremely large claims. Mean LTCC was 
$4,575.09 (SD=$13,036.18), or 3.16 (SD=4.13) log LTCC. The log mean does not 
convert directly to the dollar mean, because the mean of logged values is less 
influenced by high values than the mean of dollar values. Mean of dollar values was 
calculated as mean (exp(LTCC) -1), mean of log values was calculated as mean (log 40 
LTCC).The average claim cost was $13,910.0, meaning an organization of 100 
employees averaged .329 average-sized claims per quarter.   
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To examine effects of LTCC on time to failure, organizations were dummy coded as 
“failed” or “ongoing” at the last timepoint of the QCEW dataset (2014 quarter 4). 
Time to failure in quarters was calculated as exit time minus entry time in quarters. To 
deal with left-truncated organizations, age at dataset entry was included in the model 
as a control covariate.  5 
To assess the effect of long-term growth (growth) on time to failure, growth for 
organization i in its final quarter (t final) was captured as the log of the number of 
employees in its final quarter minus the log of the number of employees in the first 
quarter. A constant of .01 was added to employment in the final quarter and to 
employment in first quarter prior to calculation, to avoid losing zero values. Logged 10 
growth was divided by the total number of quarters between the first and final 
quarters. Growth was again top-coded at the 99th percentile and bottom coded at the 
1st percentile to reduce the influence of extreme growth. Mean growth after top and 
bottom coding was -.04 (SD=.26).  
We include wages-per-employee (relative to industry average) as a proxy for output-15 
per-worker. For the long-term analysis, this is calculated over the organization 
lifetime. Mean quarterly wages-per-employee were $ 7,085.99 (SD= $43,592.65).  
We included the standard deviation of employment as a proxy for employee turnover. 
For the long-term analysis, this is calculated over the organization lifetime. Mean 
turnover was 7.14 (SD= 43.08).  20 
Also included as control variables were major industry group and entry year and 
quarter, as well as mean employment per organization, calculated across the 
organizational lifetime. 
25  
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Fig. 1.  Graph depicting predicted values of Hazard Ratio (risk of failure relative to 
employers with $0 STCC, with all covariates held constant) vs. log STCC,  for all 
organizations.  
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Fig. 2.  Graph depicting predicted values of Hazard Ratio (risk of failure relative to employers with $0 STCC, with all covariates held constant) 
vs. log STCC,  grouped by organizational age in years (A; Table 1 Age; Table 2; also see Table S4) and grouped by organizational size (B; Table 
1 Size; Table 2; also see Table S4), and organizational growth (C; Table 1 Growth; Table 2; also see Table S4). There is a substantial non-linear 
effect which is greater for older (A), larger (B), and moderately fast growing organizations (C).  
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Fig. 3.  Graph depicting predicted survival (quarters between organization entry and exit relative to a firm with $0 LTCC) vs. log LTCC, for all 
organizations (A; Table 3 Main effect; also see Table 4), for organizations grouped by size (B; Table 3 Size; Table 4; also see Table S10 ), for 
organizations grouped by growth (C; Table 2 Growth; Table 4; also see Table S10). There is a substantial non-linear effect  (A), which is greater 
for larger (B), and moderately growing organizations (C). 
34   
                                                             5 The growth quartiles are unbalanced because Q3 contains all organizations with 0 growth 
Table 1. Conditional cox proportional hazards models show that increasing STCC reduces hazard but the effect is non-linear. The 
dependent variable for all models was risk of failure at time t (hazard).  
 
The Main Effect model tests the polynomial effects of log STCC.  The Age model tests the polynomial effects of STCC grouped by 
organization age.  The Size model tests the polynomial effects of STCC grouped by organization size. The Growth model tests the 
polynomial effects of STCC grouped by organization growth quartiles. 
 
 The following control variables were included in all models: year and quarter, entry year and quarter, mean employment per quarter in 
the last two years, growth, turnover, output-per-worker and industry dummy variables.  
 
Coefficients are rounded to four digits and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
Independent Variable 
Specification 
Main 
Effect Age Size Growth 
% of 
total obs. 
Controls Included Included Included Included  
Log STCC 
-0.0852 
(0.0071)     
Log STCC2 
0.0079 
(7e-04)     
Log STCC:  3-7 years  -0.0417 (0.0099)   34.46 
Log STCC:  8-12 years  -0.0616 (0.0149)   20.89 
Log STCC:  13-17 years  -0.111 (0.0192)   15.42 
Log STCC:  18-22 years  -0.168 (0.0256)   10.6 
Log STCC:  23-27 years  -0.1927 (0.0325)   6.91 
Log STCC:  28+ years  -0.2214 (0.0246)   11.72 
Log STCC2:  3-7 years  0.0047 (0.001)    
Log STCC2:  8-12 years  0.0056 (0.0015)    
Log STCC2: 13-17 years  0.0094 (0.002)    
Log STCC2: 18-22 years  0.0139 (0.0026)    
Log STCC2: 23-27 years  0.0161 (0.0033)    
Log STCC2:  28+ years  0.0191 (0.0025)    
Log STCC:  < 10 workers   
0.0088 (0.0109) , 
p=0.4191  60.8 
Log STCC:  10-30 workers   -0.0388 (0.0116)  25.68 
Log STCC:  30-100 workers   -0.1597 (0.018)  9.74 
Log STCC:  100+ workers   -0.2755 (0.0355)  3.78 
Log STCC2:  < 10 workers   
-4e-04 (0.0011) , 
p= 0.6954   
Log STCC2:  10-30 workers   0.0046 (0.0012)   
Log STCC2:  30-100 workers   0.0143 (0.0019)   
Log STCC2:  100+ workers   0.0172 (0.0038)   
Log STCC:  growth quartile 1    
0.0036 (0.0084) , 
p=0.6712 24.85 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 2    -0.1388 (0.0228) 17.19 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 3    -0.236 (0.0207) 32.93
5 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 4    -0.1664 (0.0207) 25.02 
Log STCC2:  growth quartile 1    -3e-04 (8e-04) , p=0.679  
Log STCC2:  growth quartile 2    0.0129 (0.0024)  
Log STCC2:  growth quartile 3    0.0207 (0.0021)  
Log STCC2:  growth quartile 4    0.017 (0.0021)  
Likelihood Ratio Test 
χ2 
(125)= 
84907 χ2 (135)= 85122 χ2 (131)= 82956 χ2 (131)= 45286  
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Table 2.  Values of log STCC and associated with maximum hazard reduction, and increased hazard relative to organizations with zero STCC, grouped by growth quartiles.  
 
Column (1) Maximum Reduction in Hazard, %: Column 1 refers to the percentage reduction in hazard between a firm with zero claims and one at the vertex (minimum) of the polynomial relationship between STCC 
and hazard of failure. Columns (2) and (3) provide the log(STCC) and the STCC at which this vertex occurs: This refers to the values of log(STCC) [col 2] and STCC [col 3] at which employers reduce their likelihood 
of failure the most by having claims, relative to a firm with no claims. 5 
 
Columns (4) and (5)   refer to values of log(STCC) [col 4] and STCC [col 5] above which hazard of failure is predicted to be greater than that of organizations with zero STCC. This refers to the point at which 
employers increase their likelihood of failure by having claims. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Max. reduction in hazard 
Value of STCC/log(STCC) at which this max. reduction 
occurs Increased hazard 
All organizations  20.52 % 5.39 219.73 10.78 48280.81 
 (10.98 % , 29.28 %) (3.86 , 7.67) (46.57 , 2147.23) (7.72 , 15.34) (2261.63 , 4614906.99) 
3- 7 years 8.83 % 4.44 83 8.87 7130.95 
 (-3.35 % , 19.42 %) (1.66 , 10.95) (4.28 , 56964.99) (3.33 , 21.9) (26.92 , 3245123850.76) 
8- 12 years 15.58 % 5.5 244 11 59873.14 
 (-8.42 % , 34.44 %) (1.89 , 17.78) (5.62 , 52717096.43) (3.78 , 35.56) (42.84 , 2779092361042351) 
13- 17 years 27.94 % 5.9 366 11.81 134390.26 
 (-2.9 % , 49.55 %) (2.77 , 13.39) (14.95 , 650916.56) (5.54 , 26.77) (253.39 , 423693676041.08) 
18- 22 years 39.81 % 6.04 420 12.09 177428.91 
 (1.55 % , 63.1 %) (3.09 , 12.38) (20.96 , 238135.78) (6.18 , 24.76) (481.44 , 56709124164.05) 
23- 27 years 43.82 % 5.98 396 11.97 157776.97 
 (-4.03 % , 69.56 %) (2.85 , 13.3) (16.23 , 598249.28) (5.69 , 26.6) (295.73 , 357903400476.32) 
27 +years 47.35 % 5.8 328 11.59 108186.71 
 (18.09 % , 66.25 %) (3.62 , 9.52) (36.21 , 13609) (7.23 , 19.04) (295.73 , 185232112.78) 
<10 workers ns ns ns ns ns 
10-30 workers 7.86 % 4.22 67 8.43 4603.47 
 (-5.76 % , 19.76 %) (1.15 , 13.9) (2.17 , 1083036.58) (2.31 , 27.79) (9.03 , 1172970395290.05) 
30-100 workers 35.97 % 5.58 265 11.17 70814.43 
 (12.53 % , 53.09 %) (3.46 , 9.17) (30.74 , 9586.52) (6.92 , 18.34) (1006.4 , 91920610.33) 
100+ workers  66.82 % 8.01 3006 16.02 9042459.37 
 (5.85 % , 88.25 %) (4.16 , 17.77) (62.83 , 52043640.84) (8.31 , 35.54) (4073.38 , 2708540656360314) 
Growth quartile 1 ns ns ns ns ns 
Growth quartile 2 31.16 % 5.38 216 10.76 47083.07 
 (-0.32 % , 52.76 %) (2.67 , 11.19) (13.48 , 72674.02) (5.35 , 22.39) (208.78 , 5281659055.4) 
Growth quartile 3 48.96 % 5.7 298 11.4 89407.07 
 (26.48 % , 64.57 %) (3.94 , 8.34) (50.29 , 4180.89) (7.88 , 16.68) (2629.9 , 17488219.69) 
Growth quartile 4 33.45 % 4.89 133 9.79 17821.83 
 (10.42 % , 50.56 %) (2.98 , 8.03) (18.68 , 3077.3) (5.96 , 16.06) (386.18 , 9475931.83) 10 
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                                                             6 The growth quartiles are unbalanced because Q3 contains all organizations with 0 growth 
Table 3. Linear regression models show that increasing LTCC increases survival, but the effect is non-linear. 
The dependent variable for all models was survival, in quarters.The Main Effect model tests for the 
polynomial effects of LTCC. The Size model examines the polynomial effects of LTCC grouped by 
organization size. 
 
  The Growth model examines the polynomial effects of LTCC grouped by organization growth quartiles.   
The following control variables were included in all models: entry year and quarter, mean employment per 
quarter, industry dummy variables, age at entry, growth, turnover, and output-per-worker.  
 
Coefficients are rounded to four digits and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Independent Variable 
Specification Main effect Size Growth 
% of 
total 
firms 
Controls Included Included  
 
Log LTCC 
6.9621 
(0.0894) 
 
 
 
Log LTCC2 
-0.5495 
(0.0096) 
 
 
 
Log LTCC:   < 10 workers 
 
6.9064 (0.1221)  79.1 
Log LTCC:   10-30 workers 
 
7.0637 (0.1499)  27.59 
Log LTCC:   30-100 workers 
 
5.8796 (0.2517)  8.57 
Log LTCC:   100+ workers 
 
5.6116 (0.469)  2.72 
Log LTCC2:  < 10 workers 
 
-0.5642 (0.013)  
 
Log LTCC2:  10-30 workers 
 
-0.5529 (0.0168)  
 
Log LTCC2:  30-100 workers 
 
-0.3895 (0.0288)  
 
Log LTCC2:  100+ workers 
 
-0.281 (0.0538)  
 
Log LTCC:  growth quartile 1 
 
 1.2356(0.1761) 25 
Log LTCC:  growth quartile 2 
 
 7.0724(0.1645) 21.29 
Log LTCC:  growth quartile 3 
 
 9.731(0.1449) 28.76 
Log LTCC:  growth quartile 4 
 
 4.6498(0.1846) 25 
Log LTCC2:  growth quartile 1 
 
 -0.1402(0.0187) 
 
Log LTCC2:  growth quartile 2 
 
 -0.4971(0.0183) 
 
Log LTCC2:  growth quartile 3 
 
 -0.6924(0.0162) 
 
Log LTCC2:  growth quartile 4 
 
 -0.4195(0.0201) 
 
R2 
R2 = .35, F(31, 
122530) = 
2114, p < 
.001. 
R2 = .35, F(37, 
122524) = 1787 p < 
.001. 
R2 = .4, F(37, 
122524) = 2210, 
p < .001.  
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Table 4.  Values of log LTCC associated with the maximum survival, and with reduced survival relative to organizations with 0 LTCC.  
 
Column (1) Maximum Increase in Survival (quarters): Column 1 refers to the increase in survival time (in quarters)  between a firm with zero claims and one at the vertex (maximum) of the polynomial relationship 
between LTCC and survival. 
 5 
Columns (2) and (3) provide the log(LTCC) and the LTCC at which this vertex occurs: This refers to the values of log(LTCC) [col 2] and LTCC [col 3] at which employers increase their survival time the most by 
having claims, relative to a firm with no claims. 
 
Columns (4) and (5)   refer to values of log(LTCC) [col 4] and LTCC [col 5] above which survival is predicted to be less than that of organizations with zero LTCC. This refers to the point at which employers reduce 
their survival by having claims. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.  10 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Max.  Increase in Survival Value of LTCC/log(LTCC) at which this max. reduction occurs Survival < 0 
All organizations 22.05  6.33  711.44  12.67  507573.3  
 (20.19 , 23.92) (5.97 , 6.72) ( 428.32 , 1242.4 ) (11.94 , 13.45) ( 184315.75 , 1546042.73 ) 
<10 workers 21.14  6.12  454  12.24  207118.1  
 (18.72 , 23.55) (6.63 , 5.65) ( 758.09 , 284.18 ) (13.26 , 11.31) ( 576221.18 , 81329.35 ) 
10-30 workers 22.56  6.39  594  12.78  353530.54  
 (19.34 , 25.78) (7.07 , 5.78) ( 1180.93 , 322.13 ) (14.15 , 11.56) ( 1396957.69 , 104412.62 ) 
30-100 workers 22.19  7.55 1895  15.1  3595702.87 
 (15.25 , 29.13) (9.57 , 6.04) ( 14291.25 , 418.52 ) (19.13 , 12.08) ( 204268505.43 , 175999.53 ) 
100+ workers  28.02  9.99  21699  19.97  470876664.77  
 (8.32 , 47.71) (18.6 , 6.07) ( 119744443.1 , 432.17 ) (37.2 , 12.14) 
( 14338731893414168 , 
187638.99 ) 
Growth quartile 1 2.72  4.41  81  8.81 6720.89  
 (0.49 , 4.96) (7.63 , 2.52) (11.4, 2064.16) (15.27 , 5.03) (4264880.62 , 152.69) 
Growth quartile 2 25.16  7.11  1228  14.23  1509543.41  
 (21.05 , 29.26) (8.02 , 6.33) (561.53 , 3029.18) (16.03 , 12.66) (9182000.34 , 316438.69) 
Growth quartile 3 34.19  7.03  1126  14.05  1269348.37  
 (30.63 , 37.75) (7.58 , 6.52) (679.48 , 1957.01) (15.16 , 13.05) (3833790.21 , 463052.63) 
Growth quartile 4 12.88  5.54  254  11.08  65129.47  
 (9.67 , 16.1) (6.59 , 4.67) (105.92 , 728.55) (13.18 , 9.34) (532241.6 , 11430.53) 
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Table 5.  Robustness Checks. The table below summarizes the consistency of the direction and significance of 
the linear and squared terms with the main analyses. Details of these analyses and the corresponding results are 
provided in the online supplement.  
• In tests 1-4, we tested whether the results were consistent when we operationalized providing a safe 
workplace as either a count of claims or a binary claims / no claims measure, rather than cost of claims. 5 
• In test 5, we tested whether the results are robust to an alternative modelling method (discrete time 
hazard models; e.g. Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2011).  
• In test 6 we extended the time lag from the short-term analysis from 1 quarter to 1 year, to ensure that 
the results are not driven by the particular time lag in the short-term analysis.  
• In test 7, we predict failure in the long-term sample using logistic regression to ensure that the main 10 
long-term results are not unique to the prediction of time to failure.  
• In tests 8-9, we split claims costs into quartiles and deciles to test the u shaped functional form of the 
relationship between claims costs and failure.  
• In tests 10-11, we excluded organizations that never exceeded 10 employees in their lifetime in order to 
rule out that small organizations (which exceed 5 but not 10 employees) drive the results. 15 
• In tests 12-13, we tested whether the results were consistent when we operationalized industry as either 
a 4 digit NAICS code or as the accident rate at the 4 Digit NAICS level rather, than as a 2 digit NAICS 
code 
The results are robust to alternative operationalizations of providing a safe workplace, the analytical approach, 
the choice of time lag, the exclusion criteria used to create the samples, the form of the relationship and the 20 
operationalization of failure. 
 
† CCPH: conditional cox proportional hazards model; DTHM: discrete time hazards model; MR: multiple regression; LR: logistic regression;     
†† ST: short-term sample; LT: long-term sample; MT: medium-term sample 
††† p < 0.001  25   
Test 
# 
Test  IV DV Model† Sample†† Consistent 
with main 
analysis ††† 
Supplement 
pp 
1 Alternative operationalizations of 
claims 
Count of 
claims 
Hazard CCPH ST Yes  8 
2 Time to Failure MR LT Yes  10 
3 Binary 
claims 
Hazard CCPH ST Yes  11 
4 Time to Failure MR LT Yes  12 
5 Discrete time hazards models Cost of 
Claims 
Hazard DTHM ST  Yes  13 
6 Medium Term analysis Cost of 
Claims 
Hazard CCPH MT Yes  15 
7 Predicting Failure instead of time 
to failure 
Cost of 
Claims 
Log odds of 
failure 
LR LT Yes  17 
8 Alternative Functional Forms 
(deciles and quartiles) 
Cost of 
Claims 
Hazard CCPH ST Yes  18 
9   Time to Failure MR LT Yes  19 
10 Exclusion criteria 
 (<=10 vs. <=5 employees)  
Cost of 
Claims 
Hazard CCPH ST Yes  20 
11 Time to Failure MR LT Yes  21 
12 Alternative operationalizations of 
industry 
Cost of 
Claims 
Hazard CCPH ST Yes  22 
13   Time to Failure MR LT Yes  24 
39  
Table A1. Descriptive statistics and correlations for ST sample (short-term analysis).  
 Variables mea
n 
sd min max [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [
6
] 
[
1
] 
Log STCC 
1.95 3.71 0.00 11.66 1           
[
2
] 
Mean employment per quarter in 
the past 2 years 26.23 
166.
42 0.00 
17861
.17 
0.1
48 1         
[
3
] 
Quarterly growth 
0.00 0.14 -1.49 1.63 
-
0.0
01 
0.0
05 1       
[
4
] 
Output-per-worker 
0.00 1.00 -2.51 50.99 0.057 
0.0
44 
0.0
12 1     
[
5
] 
Turnover 
2.81 5.46 0.00 39.44 0.303 
0.4
08 
-
0.0
05 
0.0
48 1   
[
6
] 
Entry year and quarter 1993
.72 5.87 
1989
.00 
2012.
75 
-
0.1
05 
-
0.0
50 
0.0
34 
-
0.0
75 
-
0.0
47 
1 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics and correlations for LT sample (long-term analysis).  
 Variables mean sd min max [1] [2] [3] [4]     
[1] Log LTCC 3.16 4.13 0.00 11.42 1               
[2] Mean employment per quarter  18.28 101.08 0.09 11790.21 0.103 1 
            
[3] Quarterly growth -0.04 0.26 -1.40 0.76 0.040 0.016 1           
[4] Output-per-worker -0.09 0.72 -1.92 35.65 0.077 0.062 0.021 1         
[5] Turnover 7.14 43.08 0.00 5913.87 0.095 0.831 -0.003 0.065        
[6] Entry year and quarter 1996.89 7.77 1989.00 2014.50 -0.204 -0.052 0.058 -0.073       
[7] Time to Failure 39.59 32.29 1.00 103.00 0.339 0.077 0.140 0.155       
[8] Age at Entry 10.67 26.59 -3.00 319.00 0.161 0.109 -0.020 0.124     
 5 
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Short-term analysis and results 
To examine the effects of log STCC on risk of failure, a series of conditional cox 
proportional hazards models were performed on the ST sample (103,906 organizations). 
Table S1 shows the distribution of the ST sample by industry and Table S2 shows descriptive 
statistics of claims, by year.  5 
A conditional proportional hazards model was selected for several reasons. It allows for the 
assessment of hazard (risk of failure) and  does not make assumptions about the shape of the 
survival function (Cox, 1972). It accounts for censoring (Evans, 1987) and left truncation 
(Guo, 1993). It allows covariates to vary over time (Fisher and Lin, 1999). Cox proportional 
hazards regression models estimate the effect of covariates on hazard of experiencing an 10 
event, in this case organizational failure (Cox, 1972). Because the models are conditional, 
start times are defined using organizational age at each time point. Hazard coefficients 
measure the impact of each covariate; a coefficient greater than 0 implies an increase in risk 
of failure, whereas a coefficient less than 0 implies a decrease in risk of failure. Hazard ratios 
(exponentiated hazard coefficients) indicate the percent change in likelihood of failure per 15 
covariate unit increase, with a ratio greater than 1 implying an increase in risk of failure and a 
ratio less than one implying a decrease. Survival probabilities are not calculated for the 
conditional cox model, because of the use of time varying covariates (e.g., Thomas and 
Reyes, 2014).  
As shown in Tables S3, 6 conditional cox proportional hazards models were constructed. 20 
Model 1 includes only the control variables (see Table S3). Model 2 includes control 
variables and log STCC. Increases in log STCC are associated with a lower risk of failure, as 
indicated by the negative coefficient for log STCC, improving model fit over the control 
variables alone (χ2(1) = 51.47). Model 2 predicts that a one-unit increase in log STCC is 
associated with a 0.94 % (0.68 %, 1.19 %)7 lower risk of failure in the current quarter relative 25 
to organizations with no short-term claims (see Table S3). Risk of failure relative to 
organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, may be calculated as exp 
(-0.0094 (0.0013)  *log STCC) (standard errors in brackets).   
Model 3 (Table S3) tests whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including a 
polynomial term ((log STCC)2) as an independent variable. We note that the third-order 30 
polynomial model was non-significant, and as such no polynomial terms beyond the squared 
term were included. The formula is as follows:  H(t)=h0(t)×exp(entry year and quarter + mean employment per quarter in the last two years + industry dummy variables + year and quarter +  growth +  growth2 + output-per-worker + turnover + Log STCC + (log STCC)2) 35 
where H(t)is the hazard function and h0(t) is the baseline hazard.  
The positive coefficient for the log STCC squared term implies a U-shaped curve (see Table 
S3 Model 2; and Table 1 and Fig. 1 in the main body). Including this term improved model 
fit, χ2(1) = 122.15. The minimum of the curve does occur in the range of log STCC in the 
data. In Model 3, having claims is associated with up to a 20.52 % (10.98 %, 29.28 %) lower 40 
risk of failure relative to organizations with zero STCC (see also Table 2 in the main body;                                                              7 Results reported in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals unless otherwise noted 
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and Table S3 for complete results). When STCCs are very high, the curve crosses H(t)=0, 
implying that claims are associated with an increased risk of failure when compared to 
organizations with no claims. For the full sample, this occurs when log STCC = 10.78 (7.72, 
15.34), above the 90th percentile. Risk of failure relative to organizations with no claims, 
holding all other covariates constant, may be calculated as exp (-0.0852 *log STCC + 5 
0.0079*(log STCC)2.  
Model 3 (Table S3) may violate the assumption of proportional hazards if the effects vary 
over time (organizational age in the models) potentially causing model misspecification 
(Schemper,1992) and loss of power (Schemper, 1992; Lagakos and Schoenfeld, 1984).  
Therefore in Model 4, the polynomial effects of log STCC on hazard are grouped by 10 
organizational age (3-7 years, 8-12 years, 13-17 years, 18-22 years, 23-27 years, 28 years or 
more) when examining the effect of log STCC on risk of failure (Table S3; see also Table 1, 
Table 2 and Fig. 2 in the main body). We used z-tests to compare the equality of regression 
coefficients of log STCC between age groupings (Paternoster et al., 1998; Clogg, Petkova & 
Haritou, 1995; see Salvador & Villena, 2013 and Lawrence, Slaon & Sun, 2018 for similar 15 
examples). The group comparisons showed that the log STCC coefficients are generally 
significantly larger in older groupings relative to younger ones (see Table S4; for detail on 
maximum reductions in hazard for each grouping see Table 2 in the main body). There were 
no significant differences in comparisons between the youngest groupings (3-7 years vs. 8-12 
years) and the oldest groupings (13-17 years vs. 18-22 years, and any combination of 18-22 20 
years, 23-27 years and 28 years or more). The comparisons of the log STCC squared term 
coefficients showed a similar pattern (Table S4). We also stratify our short-term robustness 
check models by age categories to account for the potential influence of non-proportional 
hazards.  
In Model 5 (Table S3 for full results; see also Table 1, Table 2 and Fig. 2), the polynomial 25 
effects of log STCC on hazard are grouped by organizational size (<10 workers, 10-30 
workers, 30-100 workers, 100 workers or more). This was done because large organizations 
have more claims and are more likely to survive (e.g. Evans, 1987). For organizations with 
<10 employees, no significant effect exists at the p<.001 level. As before, we used z tests to 
compare group coefficients. The group comparisons showed that the log STCC coefficients 30 
are significantly larger in larger groupings relative to smaller ones (see Table S4). The 
comparisons of the log STCC squared term coefficients showed a similar pattern. 
In Model 6 (Table S3 for full results; see also Table 1, Table 2, and Fig. 2), a model was 
constructed which grouped the effects of log STCC by growth. To further investigate a 
potential interaction between short-term growth and STCC, we grouped the effects of log 35 
STCC on hazard by short-term growth quartiles. Quartile cutoffs expressed as percent change 
in employment per quarter were: -51% to -2.25%; -2.25% to 0%; 0% to 2.82%; and 2.82% to 
69.35%.  
In Model 6 (Table S3; also Table 1, Table 2, and Fig. 2), the polynomial effects of log STCC 
on hazard are grouped by organizational growth quartiles. This was done because growing 40 
organizations have been shown to have more claims and are more likely to survive (e.g. 
Phillips and Kirchloff, 1989; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2018). The effect of log STCC on 
hazard was not significant for organizations with the lowest growth (quartile 1). Again, we 
used z tests to compare group coefficients (see Table S4 also see Table 2 and Fig. 2). The 
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group comparisons showed that the log STCC coefficients are significantly larger in quartile 
3 than all other quartiles. Quartiles 2 and 4 did not differ (p>.05), and quartiles 2, 3, and 4 
showed larger effects of log STCC than quartile 1. The comparisons of the log STCC squared 
term coefficients showed a similar pattern. 
Three supplemental tests were also performed, examining the effects of industry groupings, 5 
turnover, and output-per-worker on the magnitude of the effect of log STCC on hazard. First, 
the polynomial effects of log STCC on hazard are grouped by industry. We focus on seven 
industries because of both the large total number of industries and the fact that many 
industries lack enough organizations to derive meaningful conclusions. The industries 
examined were selected to create a quasi-experimental design based on industry-average 10 
wages and industry-average STCC. The managerial literature, which predicts that harming 
workers also will harm the organization, is based on theories of human capital (e.g., Becker, 
1993). Wages are a proxy for how productive the human capital in an industry is, hence the 
first selection criteria for industry was (high or low) wages for the industry. Institutional 
effects may exist, however, that make accidents accepted in industries where claims are more 15 
common. Otherwise stated, in industries where accidents are the norm, harming the 
workforce might be accepted and not impact survival. In industries with relatively low levels 
of accidents, harming the workforce may not be seen as acceptable or normal, posing the risk 
of harm to organizational survival. Therefore, the second selection criteria was industry-
average STCC (low, medium, and high).  20 
The seven industries captured in this design were ; low wages and low claims (Retail; NAICS 
44-45); low wages and medium claims (Administration; NAICS 56); low wages and high 
claims (Agriculture; NAICS 11); high wages and low claims (Professional Services; NAICS 
54); high wages and medium claims (Manufacturing; NAICS 31-33); high wages and high 
claims (Construction; NAICS 23). We also examined Accommodation and Food (NAICS 25 
72), a very low-wage, low-claim industry that is large and has a prevalence of precarious 
workers. However, because wages are so much lower in this industry than any other, we 
could not create a match. We follow the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics by combining 
NAICS 44-45 into a single retail industry and 31-33 into a single manufacturing industry. As 
a robustness check, we also decomposed these industries, with the results unchanged. Finally, 30 
we also examined the industry’s average time to failure because organizations in industries 
with a relatively low likelihood of failure will be better able to survive in general. Full results 
are available on request from the authors.  
We used z tests to compare group coefficients (see Table S5). The log STCC coefficients are 
significantly larger for agriculture (high claims) than any of the low claims industries (Retail, 35 
and Professional and technical services, and Accommodation and food services), and another 
high claims industry (Construction). There were no other significant effects. The comparisons 
of the log STCC squared term coefficients showed a similar pattern. 
We also wished to further investigate potential interactions between short-term employee 
turnover and STCC, so we grouped the effects of log STCC on hazard by short-term turnover 40 
quartiles. Quartile cutoffs expressed as the standard deviation of employment per quarter 
were: 0 to .65; .65 to 1.18, 1.18 to 2.44 and 2.44 to 38.44.  
We performed a conditional Cox proportional hazards model to test for polynomial effects of 
log STCC on hazard grouped by organizational turnover quartiles. This was done because 
44  
organizations with high turnover may have increased harm to workers (Khanzode et al., 
2012; Burt, 2016) and poorer organizational performance (Koys, 2001).The protective effect 
of increasing log STCC is present only for organizations with higher turnover (quartiles 3 and 
4; full results are available on request from the authors). Again, we used z tests to compare 
group coefficients (see Table S6). The group comparisons showed that the log STCC 5 
coefficients did not differ significantly between quartiles 3 and 4. The comparisons of the log 
STCC squared term coefficients showed a similar pattern.  
We also investigated potential interactions between output-per-worker and STCC, so we 
grouped the effects of log STCC on hazard by output-per-worker quartiles. Quartile cutoffs 
expressed as industry standardized wages per 100 workers per quarter were: -2.51 to -.55; -10 
.55 to -.19; -.19 to .31 and .31 to 50.99.  
We grouped the polynomial effects of log STCC on hazard by organizational output-per-
worker quartiles in a conditional cox proportional hazards model (full results available on 
request from authors). This was done because organizations with higher output-per-worker 
may expose their workers to greater hazard (Zohar, 2008), but also be more likely to survive 15 
(Jovanovic, 1982). Again, we used z tests to compare group coefficients (see Table S6). The 
group comparisons showed that the log STCC coefficients are significantly larger in quartiles 
3 and 4 than quartiles 1 and 2. Quartiles 3 and 4 did not differ significantly, nor did quartiles 
1 and 2. The comparisons of the log STCC squared term coefficients showed a similar 
pattern.  20 
The short-term models indicate that increased STCC predicts increased survival in the current 
quarter; this effect is curvilinear (u-shaped) and increased STCC eventually harms survival. 
This pattern is consistent but strongest for older and larger organizations, as well as those 
with zero to moderate levels of growth and higher output-per-worker. There were no clear 
pattern across industry or turnover.  25 
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Long-term analysis and results 
We performed the long-term analysis because the short-term impact of not providing a safe 
workplace might be to reduce costs, increasing survival. In the long-term, the effects might 
be different.  
Specifically, we ran a set of linear regression analyses with the organization’s time to failure 5 
in quarters as the dependent variable, and the logged average quarterly claims cost over its 
lifetime was the key explanatory variable. Control variables were as in the ST analysis, but 
year and quarter was not included (as the analysis is not carried out at the quarterly level). 
Each observation in this analysis was an organization; the analysis was performed on 122,570 
organizations. Table S7 shows the distribution of the LT sample by industry.  The mean 10 
log(LTCC) was 3.16 (SD=4.13), ranging from 0 to 11.42.  
Multiple linear regression analyses were performed with time to failure in quarters as the 
dependent variable. First, a model containing only the control variables as independent 
variables was performed (full results available on request from the authors). Second, a model 
containing control variables and log LTCC as independent variables was performed. 15 
Including log LTCC in the second model explained an additional 5.44% of the variance in 
survival (33.1% of variance vs. 27.66% of the variance accounted for by control variables; 
full results available on request from the authors). Increasing log LTCC by 1 is associated 
with a 1.99 (2.18, 2.27) quarter increase in survival.  
A third model was performed (Main effect: Table 3) which contains the control variables, log 20 
LTCC, and a log LTCC squared term to test for a non-linear relationship. As with STCC, the 
third-order polynomial term was non-significant, so no polynomial terms beyond the squared 
term were included. The formula is as follows:  Time to failure = mean employment per quarter + industry dummy variables + age at entry + entry year and quarter + output-per-worker + turnover + growth  25 + growth2 + Log LTCC+ (Log LTCC)2 
The relationship between LTCC and time to failure has an upside-down U-shape, as indicated 
by the negative coefficient for the log LTCC squared term (see also Fig. 3 in the main body). 
Including this term improved model fit, χ2(1) =3215.6. The maximum of this curve does 
occur within the range of LTCC. At the curve’s maximum, organizations increase their time 30 
to failure by 22.05 (20.19, 23.92) quarters (see also Table 4 in the main body). This occurs at 
LTCC= 6.33 (5.97, 6.72) which is above the 65th percentile. From here, the time to failure 
benefits of LTCC diminish. LTCC levels above 12.67 (11.94, 13.45),  which is above the 90th 
percentile, relate to a shorter time to failure than organizations with no claims. 
In a fourth model (Size; Table 3), the polynomial effects of log LTCC are stratified by 35 
organizational size, consistent with the short-term models. Again, we used z tests to compare 
coefficients on LTCC for the separate regressions run with the different groups  (Table S8). 
The results suggest that the effect of log LTCC on time to failure is larger for larger 
organizations relative to smaller ones (see also Size, Fig. 3 and Table 4).The group 
comparisons showed that the log LTCC coefficients are significantly bigger in the larger 40 
organizations (30-100 workers, and 100+ workers)than the smaller ones (<10 and 10-30 
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workers). The comparisons of the log LTCC squared term coefficients showed a similar 
pattern.  
In a fifth model (Growth, Table 3, Fig., 3; also see Table 4) the effects of log LTCC were 
grouped by growth quartiles. To investigate a potential interaction between long-term growth 
and LTCC, we grouped the effects of log LTCC on survival by long-term growth quartiles, 5 
consistent with the short-term models. Quartile cutoffs expressed as percent change in 
employment per quarter were: -75.26% to -5.2%; -5.2% to 0%; 0% to 3.37%; 3.37% to 
113.65%. Again, we used z tests to compare group coefficients (Table S8). The group 
comparisons showed that the largest effects were associated with zero to moderate levels of 
growth. Quartile 3 shows larger effects than any other quartile. The comparisons of the log 10 
LTCC squared term coefficients showed a similar pattern. 
Consistent with the short-term analyses, three additional models were performed to test 
whether the effects of log LTTC differ across groupings of industry, turnover, and output-
per-worker. First, organizations were stratified by industry categories according to their 
average quarterly wage and log LTCC (as in the short-term models). Full results are available 15 
on request from the authors. Increases in log LTCC are associated with longer survival for all 
industry groups examined. Z tests were again performed but there were no clear patterns (see 
Table S9).  
To further investigate a potential interaction between long-term turnover and LTCC, we 
grouped the effects of log LTCC on survival by long-term turnover quartiles, consistent with 20 
the short-term models. Quartile cutoffs expressed as standard deviation of employment per 
quarter were: 0 to 1.6; 1.6 to 2.54; 2.54 to 4.91; 4.91 to 5913.87. Full results are available on 
request from the authors. Again, we used z tests to compare group coefficients (see Table 
S10). The log LTCC coefficient was significantly larger for quartile 2 than quartile 1, and 
quartile 4 than quartile 2. There are no other significant differences between quartiles. The 25 
comparisons of the log STCC squared term coefficients showed a similar pattern. 
To further investigate a potential interaction between long-term output-per-worker and 
LTCC, we grouped the effects of log LTCC on survival by long-term output-per-worker 
quartiles, consistent with the short-term models. Quartile cutoffs expressed as industry 
standardized output-per-worker per 100 workers per quarter, were: -1.92 to -.51; -.53 to -.23; 30 
-.23 to .16; .16 to 35.65. Full results are available on request from the authors.  Again, we 
used z tests to compare group coefficients (see Table S10). The log LTCC coefficient was 
significantly larger for quartiles 2, 3 and 4 than quartile 1. There are no other significant 
differences between quartiles. The comparisons of the log STCC squared term coefficients 
showed a similar pattern, with an additional significant comparison between quartiles 2 and 35 
4. 
The results of the long-term models indicate that increased LTCC predicts longer 
organizational survival; this effect is curvilinear (inverse u-shaped) and eventually turns 
negative. This pattern is consistent but strongest for the largest organizations, and those with 
zero to moderate levels of growth. 40 
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Alternative operationalizations of providing 
a safe workplace - count of claims 
 
 5 
The primary measures of providing a safe workplace are STCC and LTCC, because all things 
being equal higher claims costs indicate either more claims or more severe claims. However, 
workers who are unaware of the costs of claims,  will be aware of the frequency of claims, 
and may respond to frequency more than severity. Therefore, we replaced cost of claims with 
count of claims as a robustness check.  10 
 
To assess the effect of short-term claims count (STcount) on risk of failure, STcounts were 
captured at each time point (quarter) as a time-varying covariate (Fisher and Lin, 1999). Like 
STCC, STcount was defined as the mean claims count per 100 workers per quarter per 
organization in the past two years. As with STCC, STcount was log transformed due to 15 
extreme positive skew. To avoid losing 0 values in the transformation, 1 was added prior to 
log transformation. STcount was top coded at the 99th percentile to reduce the influence of 
having a very large number of claims. Mean log STcount after top coding was.17 (SD= .38) 
or .31 (SD=.79) claims per 100 workers per quarter.  
 20 
To examine the effects of log STcount on risk of failure, a series of conditional cox 
proportional hazards models were performed on the ST sample (103,906 organizations).  
As shown in Table S11, four conditional cox proportional hazards models were constructed. 
Model 1 (Table S11) includes only the control variables as independent variables. Model 2 
(Table S11) includes control variables and log STcount as independent variables. Increases in 25 
log STcount did not improve model fit over the control variables alone (χ2(1) =.06).  
Model 3 (Table S11) tests whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including a 
polynomial term (log STcount2) as an independent variable. There is a protective effect of 
STcount which appears to have an upper limit, as indicated by the positive coefficient for the 
log STcount squared term. Including this term improved model fit, χ2(1) = 116.65. Having 30 
claims is associated with up to a 12.23 % (5.55 %, 18.43 %) lower risk of failure relative to 
organizations with zero STcount. Diminishing returns exist beyond this vertex, and when 
STcounts are very high, they are associated with an increased risk of failure.  Risk of failure 
relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, may be 
calculated as exp (-0.3858 *log STcount + 0.2852  *(log STcount)2). 35 
The polynomial effects of log STcount on hazard in Model 4 are grouped by organizational 
age (3-7 years, 8-12 years, 13-17 years, 18-22 years, 23-27 years, 28 years or more) when 
examining the effect of log STcount on risk of failure. There was no significant effect for the 
youngest organizations (3-7 years), but there were significant curvilinear effects for all other 
groupings, consistent with the results for log STCC.  40 
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The short-term models indicate that increased STcount predicts increased survival in the 
current quarter in the same way as STCC; this effect is curvilinear (U shaped) and increased 
STcount eventually harms survival.  
   5 
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Long-term claims count 
 
We tested whether the long-term results are robust using a different operationalization of 
protecting the workforce - claims counts. To test the effect of long-term claims count 
(LTcount) on time to failure, LTcount was calculated as mean claims counts per 100 workers 5 
per quarter per organization, calculated across the lifetime of each organization. Long-term 
claims count was log transformed due to extreme positive skew. To avoid losing 0 values in 
the transformation, 1 was added prior to transformation, in a similar fashion to the short-term 
claims count. LTcount was top coded at the 99th percentile to reduce the influence of having a 
very large number of claims. Mean LTcount was .20 (SD=.34), or .32 (SD=.66) claims per 10 
100 workers per quarter.  
 
To examine the effects of log LTcount on survival, multiple linear regression analyses were 
performed on the LT sample (122,570 organizations). Several multiple linear regression 
analyses were performed with time to failure in quarters as the dependent variable (full 15 
results are available on request from authors). First, we included only the control variables as 
independent variables. Second, we included control variables and log LTcount as 
independent variables. Including log LTcount in the second model we performed explained 
an additional .07% of the variance in survival (27.73% of variance vs. 27.66% of the variance 
accounted for by control variables). Increases in log LTcount improved model fit over the 20 
control variables alone (χ2(1) =179.79).  Increasing log LTcount by 1 is associated with a 
2.58 (2.11, 3.05) quarter increase in time to failure. 
A third model contained the control variables, log LTcount, and a log LTcount squared term 
to test for a non-linear relationship. Full results are available on request from the authors. The 
predicted protective effect of log LTcount has an upper limit, as indicated by the negative 25 
coefficient for the log LTcount squared term. Including this term improved model fit, 
explaining an additional 4.97% of the variance in survival (32.7% of variance vs. 27.73% of 
the variance accounted for by control variables and LTcount alone). Organizations may 
increase their time to failure by up to 16.45 (15.41, 17.49) quarters. Diminishing returns exist 
beyond this vertex, and at very high levels of claims there is an increased risk of failure.   30 
The results of the long-term models indicate that increased LTcount predicts longer 
organizational time to failure in the same manner as LTCC; this effect is curvilinear (inverse 
u-shaped) and eventually turns negative.  
This robustness check suggests that our results are not sensitive to changing the 
operationalization of providing a safe workplace from cost of claims to a count of claims, 35 
providing additional confidence in the results.  
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Alternative operationalizations of providing 
a safe workplace – claims as a binary 
Both the claims cost and claims count measures remain skewed even after log transformation. 
Plus it is possible that there is a fundamental difference between organizations that have no 
claims (either in the short or long-term). Therefore, as another robustness check we 5 
operationalized providing a safe workplace as a binary claims / no claims variable. Providing 
a safe workplace was dummy coded to test the effects of having one or more claims on the 
risk of failure - where organizations with one or more claims were coded as 1 and 
organizations with 0 claims were coded as zero. In the short-term, this was calculated over 
the previous two years (STdummy). In the short-term 77.48% of observations have 0 claims.  10 
As shown in Table S12, 3 conditional cox proportional hazards models were constructed. 
Model 1 contains only control variables. Model 2 (Table S12) includes only the control 
variables and the STdummy as independent variables. Model 2 predicts that organizations 
with claims have a 10.57 % (8.45 %, 12.65 %) lower failure risk in the current quarter 
relative to organizations with no short-term claims. Due to the binary measure, there is no 15 
polynomial model.  
The effect of the STdummy on hazard in Model 3 (Table S12) is grouped by organizational 
age when examining the effect of the STdummy on risk of failure. The effect is not 
significant for the youngest organizations.  
The short-term models indicate that having claims predicts increased survival in the current 20 
quarter, consistent with the results for STCC.  
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Long-term claims dummy 
 
Providing a safe workplace was also dummy coded for the long-term. In the long-term, this 
was calculated over the organization’s lifetime (LTdummy). 61.26% of organizations never 
have a claim in their lifetime.  5 
Two multiple linear regression analyses were performed with survival in quarters as the 
dependent variable. Full results are available from the authors on request. The first model 
contained only the control variables as independent variables. The second model contained 
control variables and LTdummy as independent variables. Including LTdummy in Model 2 
explained an additional 6.73% of the variance in survival (34.39% of variance vs. 27.66% of 10 
the variance accounted for by control variables). Having claims is associated with an 18.62 
(18.29, 18.94) quarter increase in survival relative to not having claims.  
The results of the long-term models indicate that having claims predicts longer organizational 
time to failure, in a similar manner as LTCC.  
This robustness check suggests that our results are not sensitive to changing the 15 
operationalization of providing a safe workplace from cost of claims to a binary claims/no-
claims variable, providing additional confidence in the results. 
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Discrete time hazard models 
Our quarterly timescale is coarse and results in a lot of “ties” in the data (Allison, 1982; 
Singer and Willett 2003). Therefore, we also ran a set of discrete-time hazards models to 
ensure that our short-term results are robust. We chose the Cox model for our main analysis 
due its key benefit—not needing to specify the baseline hazard function (Singer and Willett, 5 
p. 520; Allison 2014; p. 33-4). Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2011, 7th edition) noted: “The 
principal argument we have made is that in most social science settings, the Cox model 
should generally be preferred over its alternatives, for example the parametric models or 
some of the discrete models discussed in the last chapter.” (p. 85); and further “if interest 
centers primarily on the relationship between covariates and the hazard rate, then it is 10 
difficult to find settings where a parametric model would be preferred over a Cox model.” 
(p.86-7). As our focus is on the relationship between covariates (specifically, claims costs) 
and the hazard rate; and not the baseline hazard rate, we chose the Cox regression for our 
main analysis and report the discrete time hazard as a robustness check.  
Four conditional discrete time hazard models were constructed for STCC. Full results for 15 
these models are available on request from the authors. The first model included only the 
control variables as independent variables. The second model included control variables and 
log STCC as independent variables. Increases in log STCC are associated with a lower risk of 
failure, as indicated by the negative coefficient for log STCC, improving model fit 
substantially over the control variables alone (AIC=518958 vs. AIC =519010 for control 20 
variables alone). The second model predicts that a one-unit increase in log STCC is 
associated with odds of failure .99 lower relative to organizations with no short-term claims. 
The odds ratio of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates 
constant, may be calculated as exp(-0.0096 *log STCC). 
The third model tests whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including a 25 
polynomial term ((log STCC)2) as an independent variable. Consistent with the conditional 
cox proportional hazards models, the protective effect of STCC appears to have an upper 
limit, as indicated by the positive coefficient for the log STCC squared term. Including this 
term improved model fit substantially, (AIC= 518835 vs. AIC= 518958 without the squared 
STCC term). Having claims is associated with an odds ratio as low as 0.79 (0.71, 0.89) 30 
relative to organizations with zero STCC. Diminishing returns exist beyond this vertex, and 
when STCCs are very high, they are associated with an increased risk of failure.  The odds 
ratio of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, 
may be calculated as exp (-0.0865*log STCC + 0.008*(log STCC)2. 
Finally, the polynomial effects of log STCC on the log odds of failure were grouped by 35 
organizational age (3-7 years, 8-12 years, 13-17 years, 18-22 years, 23-27 years, 28 years or 
more), consistent with the Cox models. There were significant curvilinear effects for all age 
groupings, consistent with the Cox model results.  
The results of the short-term conditional discrete hazard models are consistent with those for 
the short-term conditional cox proportional hazard models. The results indicate that increased 40 
STCC predicts increased survival in the current quarter; this effect is curvilinear (u-shaped) 
and increased STCC eventually harms survival.  
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This robustness check suggests that our results are not sensitive to changing from cox 
proportional hazard models to conditional discrete hazard models, providing additional 
confidence in the results. 
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Medium-term analysis 
The short-term analysis explores the immediate risk of failure, with STCC being used to 
predict the risk of failure in the current quarter. Organizations facing existential crises, such 
as the threat of bankruptcy, could reduce their focus on safety and hence have more claims 5 
shortly prior to failure. The short-term results suggest the opposite. However, as a robustness 
check we explore this possibility by adding a longer lag between STCC and risk of failure. In 
the primary short-term models, failure was assessed in the current quarter (based on STCC in 
the prior 8 quarters). In the medium-term analysis, failure is assessed with a one-year lag. 
Specifically, the lag between STCC and our assessment of failure was 1 quarter in the short-10 
term analysis; in this robustness check we increase this lag to 4 quarters. For ease of 
reference, we name this new variable medium-term claims costs (MTCC). To examine the 
effect of MTCC on risk of organizational failure, organizations with fewer than three years of 
records in the QCEW (2.72% of original population) were eliminated to construct a sample of 
93,415 organizations, with a total of 3,645,774 observations, 280,6503 of which do not have 15 
claims (76.98%) (MT sample). Mean employment per organization, growth, output-per-
worker and turnover were also lagged by one year and included as control variables. All other 
control variables were as in the short-term analysis.  
To examine the effects of log MTCC on risk of failure, a series of conditional cox 
proportional hazards models were performed on the MT sample (93,415 organizations) 20 
similar to what was done with the short-term models. Four conditional cox proportional 
hazards models were constructed- full results are available from authors on request.  
The third model tested whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including a 
polynomial term (log MTCC2) as an independent variable. The protective effect of MTCC 
appears to have an upper limit, as indicated by the positive coefficient for the log MTCC 25 
squared term. Including this term improved model fit, χ2(1) = 237.13. Full results are 
available from authors on request. Having claims is associated with up to a 28.21 % (19.05 
%, 36.37 %) lower risk of failure relative to organizations with zero MTCC. Diminishing 
returns exist beyond this vertex, and when MTCCs are very high, they are associated with an 
increased risk of failure.  Risk of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all 30 
other covariates constant, may be calculated as exp (-0.124*log MTCC + 0.0116 *(log 
MTCC)2 . 
The polynomial effects of log MTCC on hazard in in the final model were grouped by 
organizational age (3-7 years, 8-12 years, 13-17 years, 18-22 years, 23-27 years, 28 years or 
more) when examining the effect of log MTCC on risk of failure, consistent with the short-35 
term models. There were significant curvilinear effects for all age groupings- consistent with 
the log STCC Cox model. Full results are available on request from the authors. 
The medium-term models indicate that increased MTCC predicts increased survival in the 
current quarter; this effect is curvilinear (u-shaped) and increased MTCC eventually harms 
survival, consistent with the short-term models.  40 
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This analysis suggests that the results are not unique to our operationalization of short-term 
and provides additional confidence in the overall results.  
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Predicting failure instead of time to failure 
Organizations coded as “ongoing” still exit the dataset in 2014. When controlling for both 
organizational failure and entry year/quarter, no variance in survival exists for ongoing 
organizations because both entry and exit times are controlled. This lack of variance 5 
effectively excludes the longest surviving organizations from the long-term analysis. 
Therefore, instead of including failure as a covariate, we predict it separately as a robustness 
check. Specifically, logistic regression analyses were performed with organizational failure as 
the dependent variable (coded with 1= failure before quarter 4 of 2014, 0= ongoing at the end 
of the panel). Full results are available on request from the authors.  10 
The first model includes only control variables. The second model includes control variables 
and log LTCC. This model shows that increasing log LTCC by 1 results in a .022 (.021, .022) 
decrease in log odds of failure. The reduction in log odds of failure relative to an organization 
with no LTCC may be calculated as: -0.0216 (3e-04) *log LTCC; (standard errors in 
brackets). 15 
The third model indicates that the relationship between claims costs and log odds of failure is 
curvilinear (inverse u), as indicated by the negative coefficient for the squared term. 
Including the squared term explained an additional 1.08% of the variance in log odds of 
failure, and improved model fit χ2(1) = 4343.7. An organization with claims costs may have 
up to a 0.25 (0.22, 0.28) decrease in log odds of failure. Average log odds of failure was 0.42. 20 
The reduction in log odds of failure relative to an organization with no LTCC may be 
calculated as: -0.081* log long-term claims costs +  0.0066* (log long-term claims costs)2. 
The results of the long-term models predicting failure indicate that increased LTCC predicts a 
lower odds of failure; this effect is curvilinear (inverse-u) and eventually turns negative.  
The robustness check using failure instead of time to failure reaches the same conclusion, 25 
adding confidence to the long-term findings.   
  
57  
Alternative functional forms- short-term  
The main short-term analyses adopt a quadratic functional form. To test whether the results 
are robust to the functional form, we modelled log STCC non-parametrically by grouping it 
into quartiles and deciles.  
All values of 0 log STCC were grouped together, and coded as 0. All remaining non-zero 5 
values were grouped into quartiles (coded as 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively). Zero values were 
grouped together first because 77.47% of the log STCC observations are zero, and therefore 
breaking the sample directly into quartiles would involve assigning the 0 STCC values into 
separate groups. The log STCC cutoffs for non-zero values were as follows: quartile 1, 0.65-
7.48; quartile 2, 7.48- 8.76; quartile 3, 8.76-9.94; quartile 4, 9.94-11.66. Hereafter, the zero 10 
groupings plus the non-zero log STCC quartile groupings are referred to as log STCC 
quartiles. To examine the effects of log STCC quartiles on risk of failure, a conditional cox 
proportional hazards model was performed on the ST sample (103, 906 organizations). 
Control variables were as in the short-term models (Table S3).  
First, we tested whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including log STCC 15 
quartiles as an independent variable. There is a protective effect of log STCC quartiles which 
appears to have an upper limit, as indicated by the non-significant effect for the fourth 
quartile. Including this term improved model fit, χ2(4) = 166.9. Full results are available from 
the authors on request. Having claims is associated with a 17.75 % (14.16 %, 21.2 %) lower 
risk of failure for organizations in the first quartile, an 18.01 % (14.32 %, 21.53 %) lower risk 20 
of failure for organizations in the second quartile, a 10.58 % (6.71 %, 14.3 %) lower risk of 
failure for organizations in the third quartile, and no significant effect in the fourth quartile 
relative to organizations with zero log STCC. 
Next, we grouped all the non-zero values of log STCC into deciles, to further explore a non-
parametric functional form. Hereafter, the zero STCC group plus the non-zero log STCC 25 
decile groupings are referred to as log STCC deciles. To examine the effects of log STCC 
decile on risk of failure, a conditional cox proportional hazards models were performed on 
the ST sample (103,906 organizations). Control variables were as before.  
We tested whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including log STCC deciles 
as an independent variable (see Table S13). Full results are available on request from the 30 
authors. The results show an effect of claims which is relatively steady, and increases up to 
the fifth decile, then diminishes, becoming non-significant in the 7th decile, and eventually 
becomes negative in the tenth decile (see Table S13).  
The short-term quartile and decile models indicate that increased log STCC predicts 
increased survival in the current quarter in a fashion consistent with a curvilinear (U shaped) 35 
quadratic functional form.  
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Alternative functional forms- long-term  
To test whether the long-term results are robust to functional form, we modelled log LTCC 
non-parametrically by grouping it into quartiles and deciles.  
First, all values of 0 log LTCC were grouped together, and coded as 0. All remaining non-5 
zero values were grouped into quartiles (coded as 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively). Zero values 
were grouped together first because 61.36% of the log LTCC observations are zero, and 
therefore breaking the sample directly into quartiles would involve assigning the 0 LTCC 
values into separate groups. The log LTCC cutoffs for non-zero values were as follows: 
quartile 1, 0.67-7.03; quartile 2, 7.03-8.34; quartile 3, 8.34-9.47; quartile 4, 9.47-11.42. 10 
Hereafter, the zero group plus the non-zero log LTCC quartile groupings are referred to as 
log LTCC quartiles.  
To examine the effects of log LTCC quartiles on time to failure, a linear regression analysis 
was performed on the LT sample (122,570 organizations). Time to failure was the dependent 
variable.  15 
The first model contained the control variables, and log LTCC quartiles to test for a non-
linear relationship. Full results are available on request from the authors. There is a protective 
effect of log LTCC quartiles which appears to have an upper limit, as indicated by the non-
significant effect for the fourth quartile. Including this term improved model fit, χ2(4) = 
12611 relative to control variables alone. Having claims is associated with a 19.77 (19.25, 20 
20.29) quarters increase in time to failure for organizations in the first quartile, a 20.43 
(19.91, 20.94) quarters increase in time to failure for organizations in the second quartile, a 
20.82 (20.29, 21.34) quarters increase in time to failure for organizations in the third quartile, 
and a 12.83 (12.3, 13.37) quarters increase in time to failure for organizations in the fourth 
quartile relative to organizations with zero log LTCC. 25 
Next, we grouped all the non-zero values of log LTCC into deciles, to further explore a non-
parametric functional form. 61.36% of the observations were 0 log LTCC, the remainder 
were divided into deciles of non-zero values of log LTCC. Hereafter, the zero groupings plus 
the non-zero log LTCC decile groupings are referred to as log LTCC deciles. To examine the 
effects of log LTCC deciles on time to failure, a linear regression analysis was performed on 30 
the LT sample (122,570 organizations). Time to failure was the dependent variable.  
There is a protective effect of log LTCC quartiles which appears to have an upper limit, as 
indicated by the decreasing effects from the 6th decile (see Table S13). Including this term 
improved model fit, χ2(10) = 13172. Full results are available on request from the authors. 
The long-term quartile and decile models indicate that increased log LTCC predicts increased 35 
survival in the current quarter in a fashion consistent with a curvilinear (U shaped) quadratic 
functional form. 
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Removing small organizations- short-
term 
 The samples used in the main analyses excluded organizations that were always very small (never exceeded 5 employees) while maintaining organizations that grew from very small to 5 larger. It is possible that the exclusion criterion drove the results. Hence. we created additional 
short and long-term samples where we excluded organizations that never exceeded 10 
employees.  
 
The new short-term sample consisted of 61,054 organizations, with a total of 2,634,907 10 
observations, 1,821,352 of which do not have claims (69.12%). Full results for these models 
are available on request from the authors.  
Three conditional cox proportional hazards models were constructed. The first model 
included only the control variables as independent variables. The second model included 
control variables and log STCC as independent variables. Increases in log STCC are 15 
associated with a lower risk of failure, as indicated by the negative coefficient for log STCC, 
improving model fit over the control variables alone (χ2(1) = 16.96). The second model 
predicts that a one-unit increase in log STCC is associated with a 0.65 % (0.34 %, 0.95 %) 
lower failure risk in the current quarter relative to organizations with no short-term claims. 
Risk of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, 20 
may be calculated as exp (-0.006*log STCC).  
The third model tested whether there is a substantial non-linear component by including a 
polynomial term ((log STCC)2) as an independent variable. These models were performed 
separately to assess the impact of STCC on model fit, relative to the control variables. The 
protective effect of STCC appears to have an upper limit, as indicated by the positive 25 
coefficient for the log STCC squared term. Including this term improved model fit, χ2(1) = 
63.94. Having claims is associated with up to a 16.49 % (5.24 %, 26.4 %) lower risk of 
failure relative to organizations with zero STCC. Diminishing returns exist beyond this 
vertex, and when STCCs are very high, they are associated with an increased risk of failure.  
Risk of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, 30 
may be calculated as exp (-0.0687 *log STCC + 0.0065*(log STCC)2. 
This analysis suggests that the results are robust when the smallest organizations are excluded 
in the short-term analysis and provides additional confidence in the overall results.  
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Removing small organizations – long-term 
 
To examine the effects of log LTCC on time to failure, a set of linear regression analyses 
were performed on the LT sample, with organizations that never exceed 10 employees 
removed. The sample consisted of 68,717 organizations, 32,178 of which do not have claims 5 
(46.82%). Full results for these models are available on request from the authors.  
Three multiple linear regression analyses were performed with time to failure in quarters as 
the dependent variable. The first model contained only the control variables as independent 
variables. Model 2 contains control variables and log LTCC as independent variables. 
Including log LTCC in the second model explained an additional 5.36% of the variance in 10 
survival (37.33% of variance vs. 29.52% of the variance accounted for by control variables). 
Increasing log LTCC by 1 is associated with a 2.63 (2.56, 2.7) quarter increase in survival.  
A third model contains the control variables, log LTCC, and a log LTCC squared term to test 
for a non-linear relationship. A stopping rule was implemented, such that non-significant 
polynomial terms would not be included in the final model. Due to the third-order polynomial 15 
term being non-significant, no polynomial terms beyond the squared term were included. The 
predicted protective effect of log LTCC has an upper limit, as indicated by the negative 
coefficient for the log LTCC squared term (see also Fig. S8). Including this term improved 
model fit, χ2(1) = 1702.2. Organizations may increase their time to failure by up to 21.23 
(18.81, 23.65) quarters. Diminishing returns exist beyond this vertex, and the effect 20 
eventually turns negative.   
This analysis suggests that the results are robust when the smallest organizations are excluded 
from the long-term analysis and provides additional confidence in the overall results.  
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Alternative operationalizations of 
industry 
In the main analysis we control for potential differences between industries using two-digit 
NAICS codes. This is done using a series of dummy variables. However this is a broad 
categorization which may miss more fine grained differences in professional riskiness 5 
between industries, which could result in differing risks of claims and organizational failure.   
To address this, we performed two robustness checks. We performed each robustness check 
for both the short-term model and the long-term model; thus a total of four analyses were 
performed.  
In the short term, we first replaced the industry dummies with the professional riskiness of 10 
each industry; at the four-digit NAICS level. To examine the effects of log STCC on risk of 
failure, when controlling for professional riskiness, a series of conditional cox proportional 
hazards models were performed on the Professional Riskiness sample (84,190 organizations), 
similar to what was done with the short-term models. Four conditional cox proportional 
hazards models were constructed- full results for these models are available from the authors 15 
on request.  
The BLS accident rate data extend from 1994 to 2014 (BLS, 2019b). Professional riskiness 
was defined as the incidence rate of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses per 100 full 
time workers, per four-digit NAICS group, per year. The same value was used in all four 
quarters for a given year. Data which were reported with  NAICS 2002, 2007, or Standard 20 
Industrial Classification 1987 systems were converted into NAICS 2012. The sample for 
these analyses, consisted of 84,190 organizations, and 2,563,464 observations (as the data 
only extends back to 1994, and requires a four-digit NAICS code).  
The first model includes only control variables. The second model tested for effects of 
professional riskiness on likelihood of failure, by including professional riskiness as a control 25 
variable. Professional riskiness is associated with an increased likelihood of failure, as 
indicated by the positive coefficient for the professional riskiness term. Including this term 
improved model fit relative to controls alone, χ2(1) = 208.93 (see Table S14). Full results are 
available from the authors on request.  
The third model tests for the non-linear effects of log STCC, when including professional 30 
riskiness as a control variable. Consistent with the main analysis, there is a protective effect 
of log STCC which appears to have an upper limit as indicated by the negative coefficient for 
the log STCC term and the positive coefficient for the (log STCC)2 term (both significant at 
p<.001). Including the log STCC + (log STCC)2 terms improved model fit relative to controls 
and professional riskiness alone (Model 2), χ2(2) = 156.99, (see Table S14 and S16). Having 35 
claims is associated with up to a 23.13 % (9.48 %, 34.72 %) lower risk of failure relative to 
organizations with zero STCC. Diminishing returns exist beyond this vertex, and when STCC 
is very high, it is associated with an increased risk of failure.  Risk of failure relative to 
organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, may be calculated as exp 
(-0.0906*log STCC + 0.0078*(log STCC)2). 40 
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The second short-term robustness check addressed the issue that there might be industry 
heterogeneity not captured by professional riskiness or two-digit NAICS categorizations. 
Therefore, we also performed an analysis where we used four-digit NAICS dummy variables 
to replace the two-digit NAICS dummy controls using the same sample as above (Model 4, 
Table S15; also see Table S16). Including four digit NAICS controls improves model fit 5 
relative to control variables alone χ2(291) = 4095.8. The results for log STCC remain highly 
consistent. Including the log STCC + (log STCC)2 terms improved model fit relative to 
controls and four-digit NAICS dummy variables alone χ2(2) = 143.26. Having claims is 
associated with up to a 23.5 % (10.55 %, 34.57 %) lower risk of failure relative to 
organizations with zero STCC. Diminishing returns exist beyond this vertex, and when STCC 10 
is very high, it is associated with an increased risk of failure.  Risk of failure relative to 
organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates constant, may be calculated as exp 
(-0.0958*log STCC + 0.009*(log STCC)2). 
The two short-term models indicate that replacing the two-digit industry dummies with four-
digit industry accident rates to account for professional riskiness, does not materially change 15 
the short-term results. As with the main analysis, STCC predicts increased survival in the 
current quarter; this effect is curvilinear (U shaped) and increased STCC eventually harms 
survival, for all levels of professional riskiness. Further, the results are consistent when we 
replace the two-digit industry dummies with four-digit industry dummies.  
 20 
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Long-term industry  
 
We first tested whether the long-term results were robust to replacing the two-digit industry 
dummies with a four-digit measure of professional riskiness. Professional riskiness was 
defined as the incidence rate of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses per 100 full time 5 
workers, per four-digit NAICS group per year, calculated across the lifetime of each 
organization. 
Multiple linear regression analyses were performed with time to failure in quarters as the 
dependent variable. First, a model containing only the control variables as independent 
variables was performed - full results available on request from the authors. Second, a model 10 
containing control variables, with professional riskiness (aggregated across the dataset) was 
performed. Including professional riskiness in the second model explained an additional .08% 
of the variance in survival (25.24% of variance vs. 25.16% of the variance accounted for by 
control variables (see Table S17 and S19); full results available on request from the authors).  
A third model was performed which contains the control variables, professional riskiness, log 15 
LTCC, and a log LTCC squared term to test for a non-linear relationship between log LTCC 
and time to failure. The non-linear effects of log LTCC were consistent with the main results,  
controlling for professional riskiness. Including log LTCC + (log LTCC)2 improved model 
fit, χ2(2) = 10255. At the curve’s maximum, organizations increase their time to failure by 
20.62 (18.73, 22.51) quarters. From here, the time to failure benefits of LTCC diminish, 20 
eventually becoming negative. See Table S17 and S19. Full results are available on request 
from the authors. 
The second long-term robustness check addressed the issue that there might be industry 
heterogeneity not captured by professional riskiness, or two-digit NAICS categorizations. 
Therefore, we also performed an analysis where we used four-digit NAICS dummy control 25 
variables to replace the two-digit NAICS dummy controls using the same sample as above 
(see Table S19). Including four-digit NAICS controls improves model fit relative to control 
variables alone χ2(304) = 20228 (see Model 2, Table S18). The results for log LTCC remain 
consistent. Including the log LTCC + (log LTCC)2 terms improved model fit relative to 
controls and four-digit NAICS dummy variables alone (Model 3), χ2(2) = 11911. Having 30 
claims is associated with up to a 20.79 (18.88, 22.7) quarters increase in time to failure 
relative to organizations with zero LTCC (see Table S18 and S19). Diminishing returns exist 
beyond this vertex, and when LTCC is very high, it is associated with a reduced time to 
failure.  Risk of failure relative to organizations with no claims, holding all other covariates 
constant, may be calculated as exp (6.4226 *log STCC -0.4961 *(log STCC)2). 35 
The two long-term models indicate that replacing the two-digit industry dummies with four-
digit industry accident rates to account for professional riskiness, does not change the primary 
long-term results. Increased LTCC predicts increased survival; this effect is curvilinear (U 
shaped) and increased LTCC eventually harms survival. Further, the results are consistent 
when we replace the two-digit industry dummies with four-digit industry dummies.  40 
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Exhibits short-term analysis  
Tables S1 to S6 
 5 
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Table S1. Industry distribution of ST sample (short-term analysis). 
 
  
 Total Organizations Total Observations 
Two digit NAICS code and description N % of total N % of total 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 4708 4.53 197293 4.88 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 189 0.18 8538 0.21 
22 Utilities 92 0.09 5520 0.14 
23 Construction 12473 12 470896 11.64 
31 Manufacturing (A; Food and Textiles) 1390 1.34 55521 1.37 
32 Manufacturing (B; Chemical, Minerals, Plastics, Paper) 2398 2.31 106085 2.62 
33 Manufacturing (C; Aerospace, Computer, Metals, Ships) 3806 3.66 179530 4.44 
42 Wholesale Trade 6340 6.1 270977 6.7 
44 Retail (A; Motor, Furniture, Health,Electronic  ) 10122 9.74 384867 9.51 
45 Retail (B; Sporting Goods, General, Miscellaneous) 3689 3.55 136023 3.36 
48 Transportation and Warehousing (A; Air, Rail,Deep Sea etc. ) 2370 2.28 93823 2.32 
49 Transportation and Warehousing (B; Postal Services, Couriers etc. ) 278 0.27 9487 0.23 
51 Information 1845 1.78 67010 1.66 
52 Finance and Insurance 2780 2.68 119977 2.97 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 2964 2.85 121966 3.01 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 7563 7.28 314640 7.78 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 174 0.17 6049 0.15 
56 Administration 5698 5.48 197091 4.87 
61 Educational Services 1299 1.25 51362 1.27 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 9445 9.09 405291 10.02 
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation 1839 1.77 69898 1.73 
72 Accommodation and Food 14771 14.22 414563 10.25 
81  Other Services (except Public Administration) 7673 7.38 359905 8.89 
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Table S2. Yearly short-term claims cost (log STCC) descriptive statistics. Max was 11.66 in all years due to top-coding. Min was 0 in all years 
(no claims).  
Log STCC 
Year Mean  SD N observations 
1991 2.43 3.95 128697 
1992 2.28 3.86 135541 
1993 2.27 3.87 140377 
1994 2.3 3.89 144698 
1995 2.31 3.9 148840 
1996 2.22 3.84 152912 
1997 2.14 3.79 158313 
1998 2.13 3.79 162414 
1999 2.08 3.76 165219 
2000 2.05 3.75 167556 
2001 2.01 3.73 170712 
2002 1.93 3.69 173842 
2003 1.89 3.67 175902 
2004 1.89 3.7 177616 
2005 1.9 3.71 179096 
2006 1.89 3.7 181716 
2007 1.9 3.71 185212 
2008 1.89 3.7 187858 
2009 1.79 3.63 186979 
2010 1.66 3.54 186152 
2011 1.62 3.51 184885 
2012 1.61 3.5 184360 
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Table S3. Conditional proportional hazards models, full results.  Conditional cox proportional hazards models show that increasing STCC reduces hazard 
but the effect is non-linear. The dependent variable for all models was risk of failure at time t (hazard). Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 tests 
the linear effect of STCC. Model 3 tests for polynomial effects of STCC. Model 4 examines the polynomial effects of STCC grouped by organization age. 
Model 5 examines the polynomial effects of STCC grouped by organization size. Model 6 examines the polynomial effects of STCC grouped by growth 
quartiles.  5 
Coefficients are rounded to 4 digits, standard errors are in brackets 
 p<.001 unless otherwise specified 
Independent Variable Specification Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Linear effect 
Model 3 
Main Effect 
Model 4 
Age 
Model 5 
Size 
Model 6 
Growth 
% of 
total 
obs. 
Entry year and quarter -0.0029 (0.0017) 
p= 0.0848 
-0.0027 (0.0017) 
p= 0.1121 
-0.0025 (0.0017) 
p= 0.1359 
0 (0.0017) 
 p= 0.9986 
3e-04 (0.0017) 
p= 0.8659 
0 (0.0017) 
p= 0.9952 
 
Mean employment per quarter in the past 2 
years 
-0.0025 (2e-04) -0.0023 (2e-04) -0.0021 (2e-04) -0.0018 (1e-04) -4e-04 (1e-04) -4e-04 (1e-04)  
Year Quarter dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Quarterly growth -7.1658 (0.0504) -7.1444 (0.0504) -7.1237 (0.0504) -7.1308 (0.0504) -7.0521 (0.0506) -4.1466 (0.0621)  
Quarterly growth2 -3.9668 (0.0608) -3.9479 (0.0608) -3.9312 (0.0608) -3.9397 (0.0607) -3.9116 (0.0606) -1.2026 (0.0674)  
Output-per-worker -0.2147 (0.0056) -0.2124 (0.0056) -0.2127 (0.0056) -0.212 (0.0056) -0.2016 (0.0055) -0.1991 (0.0056)  
Turnover  0.0136 (0.001) 0.0144 (0.001) 0.015 (0.001) 0.0146 (0.001) 0.0217 (0.001) -0.0036 (0.001)  
Log STCC 
 
-0.0094 (0.0013) -0.0852 (0.0071) 
   
 
(log STCC)2 
  
0.0079 (7e-04) 
   
 
Log STCC: 3-7 years 
   
-0.0417 (0.0099) 
  
34.46 
Log STCC:  8-12 years 
   
-0.0616 (0.0149) 
  
20.89 
 Log STCC: 13-17 years 
   
-0.111 (0.0192) 
  
15.42 
Log STCC:  18-22 years 
   
-0.168 (0.0256) 
  
10.6 
Log STCC: 23-27 years 
   
-0.1927 (0.0325) 
  
6.91 
Log STCC: 28+ years 
   
-0.2214 (0.0246) 
  
11.72 
(log STCC)2:  3-7 years 
   
0.0047 (0.001) 
  
 
(log STCC)2:  8-12 years 
   
0.0056 (0.0015) 
  
 
(log STCC)2: 13-17 years 
   
0.0094 (0.002) 
  
 
(log STCC)2: 18-22 years 
   
0.0139 (0.0026) 
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(log STCC)2: 23-27 years 
   
0.0161 (0.0033) 
  
 
(log STCC)2:  28+ years 
   
0.0191 (0.0025) 
  
 
Log STCC:  < 10 workers 
    
0.0088 (0.0109), p= 
0.4191 
 
60.8 
Log STCC:  10-30 workers 
    
-0.0388 (0.0116) 
 
25.68 
Log STCC:  30-100 workers 
    
-0.1597 (0.018) 
 
9.74 
Log STCC:  100+ workers 
    
-0.2755 (0.0355) 
 
3.78 
(log STCC)2:  < 10 workers 
    
-4e-04 (0.0011), p= 
0.6954 
 
 
(log STCC)2:  10-30 workers 
    
0.0046 (0.0012) 
 
 
(log STCC)2:  30-100 workers 
    
0.0143 (0.0019) 
 
 
(log STCC)2:  100+ workers 
    
0.0172 (0.0038) 
 
 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 1      0.0036 (0.0084), p= 
0.6712 24.85 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 2      -0.1388 (0.0228) 17.19 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 3      -0.236 (0.0207) 32.93 
Log STCC:  growth quartile 4      -0.1664 (0.0207) 25.02 
(log STCC)2:  growth quartile 1      -3e-04 (8e-04), p= 
0.679 
 
(log STCC)2:  growth quartile 2      0.0129 (0.0024)  
(log STCC)2:  growth quartile 3      0.0207 (0.0021)  
(log STCC)2:  growth quartile 4      0.017 (0.0021)  
Likelihood Ratio test χ2(123)= 84734 χ2 (124)= 84785 χ2 (125)= 84907 χ2 (135)= 85122 χ2 (131)= 82956 χ2 (131)= 45286  
Summary Findings Controls predict 
hazard.    
A one unit increase in 
log STCC results in a 
.94% reduction in risk 
of failure.   
The relationship 
between log STCC 
and risk of failure is 
curvilinear.   
 
The protective effect 
of recent claims costs 
is larger for older 
organizations than 
younger ones.  
 
The protective effect 
of log recent claims 
costs is present only 
for organizations with 
>10 workers, and is 
greater for larger  
organizations than 
smaller ones.  
The protective effect 
of recent claims costs 
is larger for 
organizations with 
moderate growth than 
low growth.  
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Table S4. Z tests comparing the model coefficients for Log STCC and (log STCC)2  between age,  
size and growth groupings. 
 
Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and *= p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.  
 5 
 
Age Groups 
 Log STCC  
3-7 years 8-12 years 13-17 years 18-22 years 23-27 
years 
Log 
STCC 
 8-12 years -1.11     
 13-17 years -3.21 ** -2.03 *    
 18-22 years -4.6 *** -3.59 *** -1.78   
 23-27 years -4.44 *** -3.67 *** -2.16 * -0.6  
 28 years or 
more 
-6.78 *** -5.56 *** -3.54 *** -1.5 -0.7 
 (Log STCC)^2 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
 8-12 years 0.5     
 13-17 years 2.1 * 1.52    
 18-22 years 3.3 *** 2.77 ** 1.37   
 23-27 years 3.31 *** 2.9 ** 1.74 0.52  
 28 years or 
more 
5.35 *** 4.63 *** 3.03 ** 1.44 0.72 
Size Groups 
  Log STCC 
  < 10 workers 10-30 workers 30-100 workers 
Log 
STCC 
 10-30 
workers 
-2.99 **   
 30-100 
workers 
-8.01 *** -5.65 ***  
100 + 
workers 
-7.66 *** -6.34 *** -2.91 ** 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
 (Log STCC)^2 
 10-30 
workers 
3.07 **   
 30-100 
workers 
6.7 *** 4.32 ***  
100 + 
workers 
4.45 *** 3.16 ** 0.68 
     
Growth Groups 
  Log STCC 
  quartile 1 quartile 2 quartile 3 
Log 
STCC 
quartile 2 -5.86 ***   
quartile 3 -10.73 *** -3.16 **  
quartile 4 -7.61 *** -0.9 2.38 * 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
 (Log STCC)^2 
quartile 2 5.22 ***   
quartile 3 9.34 *** 2.45 *  
quartile 4 7.7 *** 1.29 -1.25 
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Table S5. Z tests comparing the model coefficients for Log STCC and (log STCC)2  between industry groupings. Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and 
*= p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.   
 
  Industry Group 
   Log STCC 
  Industry Group [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Log 
STCC 
[1] Accommodation & Food: Very low wage, low claims       
[2]  Administrative & Support and Waste Manindustryment & Remediation low 
wage, medium claims 
-0.77  
    
[3]   Agriculture and Forestry low wage, high claims -2.97 ** -1.82 
    
[4]  Construction high wage, high claims -0.63 0.3 2.49 * 
   
[5]  Manufacturing high wage, medium claims -1.59 -0.53 1.49 -1.03 
  
[6]  Professional & Technical Services High wage, low claims 0.63 1.04 2.38 * 0.94 1.47 
 
[7]  Retail Trade  low wage, low claims -0.31 0.51 2.65 ** 0.29 1.25 0.78 
   (Log STCC)^2 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
[1] Accommodation & Food: Very low wage, low claims       
[2] Administrative & Support and Waste Management & Remediation: low wage, 
medium claims 
0.65 
     
[3] Agriculture and Forestry: low wage, high claims 2.51 * 1.57 
    
[4] Construction: high wage, high claims 0.63 -0.18 -2.1 * 
   
[5] Manufacturing: high wage, medium claims 1.2 0.37 -1.38 0.68 
  
[6] Professional & Technical Services: High wage, low claims -0.46 -0.82 -1.91 -0.77 -1.1 
 
[7] Retail Trade : low wage, low claims 0.04 -0.61 -2.44 * -0.57 -1.14 -0.47 
71  
Table S6. Z tests comparing Log STCC coefficients, and (log STCC)2 coefficients between quartile 
groupings for output per worker, and turnover. Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and *= p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001.  
 
 5 
Output per Worker Groups 
  Log STCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
 [1] quartile 1    
Log STCC [2] quartile 2 1.32   
[3] quartile 3 -2.1 * -3.32 ***  
[4] quartile 4 -2.01 * -3.15 ** -0.04 
 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
  (Log STCC)^2 
[1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 -1.41   
[3] quartile 3 1.52 2.88 **  
[4] quartile 4 1.07 2.33 * -0.33 
      
Turnover Groups 
   Log STCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
Log STCC [1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 1.2   
[3] quartile 3 -1.6 -4.06 ***  
[4] quartile 4 -1.76 -4.57 *** -0.16 
 
(Log 
STCC)^2 
  (Log STCC)^2 
[1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 -1.11   
[3] quartile 3 1.62 3.92 ***  
[4] quartile 4 1.82 4.42 *** 0.24 
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Exhibits long-term analysis  
Tables S7 to S10 
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Table S7. Industry distribution of LT sample (long-term analysis). 
Two digit NAICS code and description N % of total 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 5484 4.47 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 222 0.18 
22 Utilities 99 0.08 
23 Construction 14738 12.02 
31 Manufacturing (A; Food and Textiles) 1638 1.34 
32 Manufacturing (B; Chemical, Minerals, Plastics, Paper) 2817 2.3 
33 Manufacturing (C; Aerospace, Computer, Metals, Ships) 4277 3.49 
42 Wholesale Trade 7226 5.9 
44 Retail (A; Motor, Furniture, Health,Electronic  ) 11856 9.67 
45 Retail (B; Sporting Goods, General, Miscellaneous) 4250 3.47 
48 Transportation and Warehousing (A; Air, Rail,Deep Sea etc. ) 2789 2.28 
49 Transportation and Warehousing (B; Postal Services, Couriers etc. ) 335 0.27 
51 Information 2192 1.79 
52 Finance and Insurance 3087 2.52 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 3280 2.68 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 8484 6.92 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 210 0.17 
56 Administration 6865 5.6 
61 Educational Services 1467 1.2 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 10569 8.62 
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation 2236 1.82 
72 Accommodation and Food 19648 16.03 
81  Other Services (except Public Administration) 8801 7.18 
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Table S8. Z tests comparing the model coefficients for Log LTCC and (Log LTCC)2  between 
size and growth groupings. Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and *= p<.05, **=p<.01, 
***=p<.001.    
Size Groups 
   Log LTCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
Log 
LTCC 
[1] < 10 
workers 
   
[2]  10-30 
workers 
0.81   
[3]  30-100 
workers 
-3.67 *** -4.04 ***  
[4] 100+ 
workers 
-2.67 ** -2.95 ** -0.5 
      
(Log 
LTCC)^2 
  (Log LTCC)^2 
  [1] [2] [3] 
[1] < 10 
workers 
   
[2]  10-30 
workers 0.53   
[3]  30-100 
workers 5.53 *** 4.9 ***  
[4] 100+ 
workers 5.12 *** 4.82 *** 1.78 
Growth Groups 
   Log LTCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
Log 
LTCC 
[1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 24.22 ***   
[3] quartile 3 37.25 *** 12.13 ***  
[4] quartile 4 13.38 *** -9.8 *** -21.65 *** 
(Log 
LTCC)^2 
  (Log LTCC)^2 
[1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 -13.64 ***   
[3] quartile 3 -22.32 *** -7.99 ***  
[4] quartile 4 -10.17 *** 2.85 ** 10.57 *** 
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Table S9. Z tests comparing the model coefficients for Log LTCC and (Log LTCC)2  between industry groupings. Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and *= p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001. 
 
  
 5 
Industry Group 
 
   Log LTCC 
  Industry Group [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 [1] Accommodation & Food: Very low wage, low claims       
Log 
LTCC 
[2]  Administrative & Support and Waste Management & 
Remediation low wage, medium claims 1.98 *      
[3]   Agriculture and Forestry low wage, high claims 5.46 *** 2.77 **     
[4]  Construction high wage, high claims 1.07 -1.17 -4.62 ***    
[5]  Manufacturing high wage, medium claims 5.04 *** 2.27 * -0.64 4.15 ***   
[6]  Professional & Technical Services High wage, low claims 11.99 *** 9.11 *** 7 *** 11.35 *** 7.73 ***  
[7]  Retail Trade  low wage, low claims 3.73 *** 0.98 -2.21 * 2.73 ** -1.61 9.31 *** 
   (Log LTCC)^2 
 [1] Accommodation & Food: Very low wage, low claims       
(Log 
LTCC)^2 
[2] Administrative & Support and Waste Management & 
Remediation: low wage, medium claims 0.94      
[3] Agriculture and Forestry: low wage, high claims -1.23 -1.91     
[4] Construction: high wage, high claims 3 ** 1.4 3.9 ***    
[5] Manufacturing: high wage, medium claims -0.65 -1.42 0.56 -3.37 ***   
[6] Professional & Technical Services: High wage, low claims -7.93 *** -7.91 *** -6.66 *** -9.99 *** -7.17 ***  
[7] Retail Trade : low wage, low claims -0.17 -1.07 1.06 -3.11 ** 0.48 -7.75 *** 
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Table S10. Z tests comparing Log LTCC coefficients, and (Log LTCC)2 coefficients between quartile 
groupings for output per worker, and turnover. Z coefficients are rounded to 2 digits, and *= p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001.  
 
Output per Worker Groups 
  Log LTCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
Log LTCC [1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 2.86 **   
[3] quartile 3 1.87 -1.27  
[4] quartile 4 0.86 -2.55 * -1.32 
 
(Log 
LTCC)^2 
  (Log LTCC)^2 
[1] quartile 1  
[2] quartile 2 -2.59 **   
[3] quartile 3 -1.35 1.51  
[4] quartile 4 1.05 4.3 *** 2.94 ** 
      
Turnover Groups 
   Log LTCC 
   [1] [2] [3] 
Log LTCC [1] quartile 1    
[2] quartile 2 4.68 ***   
[3] quartile 3 4.84 *** 0.05  
[4] quartile 4 5.47 *** 0.76 0.73 
 
(Log 
LTCC)^2 
  (Log LTCC)^2 
[1] quartile 1  
[2] quartile 2 -2.89 **   
[3] quartile 3 -1.27 1.83  
[4] quartile 4 -0.57 2.58 ** 0.78 
 5 
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Exhibits count of claims robustness check  
Table S11
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Table S11. Conditional proportional hazards models, full results using STcount.  Conditional cox proportional 
hazards models show that increasing STcount reduces hazard but the effect is non-linear. The dependent 
variable for all models was risk of failure at time t (hazard). Model 1 tests the effects of control variables on 
hazard (risk of failure at time t). Model 2 tests the effect of STcount. Model 3 tests for polynomial effects of 
STcount. Model 4 examines the polynomial effects of STcount grouped by organization age.  
Coefficients are rounded to 4 digits, standard errors are in brackets, and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. 
Independent Variable 
Specification 
Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Linear effect 
Model 3 
Main Effect 
Model 4 
Age 
% of 
total 
obs. 
Entry year and quarter -0.0029 
(0.0017), p= 
0.0848 
-0.0029 
(0.0017), p= 
0.0857 
-0.0026 (0.0017), 
p= 0.1294 
-5e-04 (0.0017), 
p= 0.7699 
 
Year /quarter dummies Included Included Included Included  
Mean employment per 
quarter in the past 2 years 
-0.0025 (2e-04)   -0.0025 (2e-04)   -0.0023 (2e-04)   -0.0021 (2e-04)    
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included  
Quarterly growth -7.1658 
(0.0504)   
-7.1653 
(0.0504)   
-7.1211 (0.0505)   -7.1263 (0.0505)    
Quarterly growth2 -3.9668 
(0.0608)   
-3.9663 
(0.0608)   
-3.9262 (0.0608)   -3.9328 (0.0608)    
Output-per-worker -0.2147 
(0.0056)   
-0.2146 
(0.0056)   
-0.2125 (0.0056)   -0.2118 (0.0056)    
Turnover  0.0136 (0.001)   0.0136 (0.001)   0.0145 (0.001)   0.0141 (0.001)    
Log STcount 
 
-0.0028 
(0.0112), p= 
0.8021 -0.3858 (0.0375)   
 
 
(Log STcoun)t2 
 
 0.2852 (0.0263)   
 
 
Log STcount: 3-7 years 
  
0.0214 (0.0524), 
p= 0.6822 34.46 
Log STcount:  8-12 years 
   
-0.3083 (0.0791)   20.89 
 Log STcount: 13-17 years 
   
-0.7415 (0.1024)   15.42 
Log STcount:  18-22 years 
   
-1.034 (0.134)   10.6 
Log STcount: 23-27 years 
   
-1.2396 (0.1662)   6.91 
Log STcount: 28+ years 
   
-1.2261 (0.1255)   11.72 
Log STcount2:  3-7 years 
   
0.0376 (0.0369), 
p= 0.3079 
 
(Log STcount)2:  8-12 
years 
   
0.2231 (0.0564)   
 
(Log STcount)2: 13-17 
years 
   
0.5013 (0.0729)   
 
(Log STcount)2: 18-22 
years 
   
0.6571 (0.0957)   
 
(Log STcount)2: 23-27 
years 
   
0.8271 (0.1178)   
 
(Log STcount)2:  28+ 
years 
   
0.8199 (0.0899)   
 
(Log STcount)2:  100+ 
workers 
   
 
 
Likelihood Ratio test χ2(123)= 84734 χ2 (124)= 84734 χ2 (125)= 84850 χ2 (135)= 85040  
Summary Findings Controls predict 
hazard.    
Log STcount 
does not 
significantly 
predict risk of 
failure.   
The relationship 
between log 
STcount and risk 
of failure is 
curvilinear.   
 
The protective 
effect of log 
STcount is larger 
for older 
organizations 
than younger 
ones. 
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Exhibits claims as a binary robustness 
check 
 Table S12
80  
Table S12. Conditional proportional hazards models, full results using STdummy.  Conditional cox proportional hazards models show that increasing 
STdummy reduces hazard. The dependent variable for all models was risk of failure at time t (hazard). Model 1 tests the effects of control variables on hazard 
(risk of failure at time t). Model 2 tests the effect of STdummy. Model 3 examines the effects of STdummy grouped by organization age.  
Coefficients are rounded to 4 digits, standard errors are in brackets, and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. 
Independent Variable 
Specification 
Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
STdummy 
Model 3 
Age 
% of 
total 
obs. 
Entry year and quarter -0.0056 
(0.0017)   -0.0026 (0.0017), p= 0.1248 -2e-04 (0.0017), p= 0.8971 
 
Year /quarter dummies Included Included Included  
Mean employment per quarter 
in the past 2 years 
0 (1e-04), p= 
0.4477 -0.0022 (2e-04)   -0.002 (2e-04)   
 
Industry dummies Included Included Included  
Quarterly growth -6.0488 
(0.0862)   -7.1347 (0.0504)   -7.1408 (0.0504)   
 
Quarterly growth2 -0.6571 
(0.0153)   -3.9397 (0.0608)   -3.9475 (0.0608)   
 
Output-per-worker -0.2092 
(0.0056)   -0.2118 (0.0056)   -0.211 (0.0056)   
 
Turnover  -0.0378 
(0.001)   0.0147 (0.001)   0.0143 (0.001)   
 
STdummy 
 
-0.1117 (0.012)     
STdummy: 3-7 years 
 
 0.0197 (0.0165), p= 0.2305 34.46 
STdummy:  8-12 years 
 
 -0.0896 (0.0246)   20.89 
 STdummy: 13-17 years 
 
 -0.2131 (0.0315)   15.42 
STdummy:  18-22 years 
 
 -0.3478 (0.0414)   10.6 
STdummy: 23-27 years 
 
 -0.3884 (0.0515)   6.91 
STdummy: 28+ years 
 
 -0.4012 (0.0393)   
11.72 
 
Likelihood Ratio test χ2(123)= 
84734 
χ2 (124)= 84822 χ2 (129)= 85020  
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Exhibits alternative functional forms 
robustness  check 
 Table S13 
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Table S13.  Values of log STCC/ log LTCC and associated with maximum hazard reduction relative to organizations with zero STCC/ LTCC, grouped by log 
STCC/LTCC deciles. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the percentage reduction in hazard is calculated as the difference in hazard at t between organizations with 
zero STCC/LTCC.  
 
  Log STCC Log LTCC 
Groupings  Lower limit Upper limit Maximum hazard reduction (%) (95% CI) Lower limit Upper limit 
Maximum hazard 
reduction (%) 
(95% CI) 
 
Deciles 
1 0.65 6.28 17.98 % (12.48 %, 23.13 %) 0.67 5.75 20.66 (19.89, 21.44) 
2 6.28 7.15 19.62 % (14.14 %, 24.75 %) 5.75 6.69 19.01 (18.24, 19.78) 
3 7.15 7.78 15.14 % (9.45 %, 20.47 %) 6.69 7.34 19.6 (18.83, 20.37) 
4 7.78 8.29 16.04 % (10.29 %, 21.43 %) 7.34 7.88 20.49 (19.72, 21.26) 
5 8.29 8.76 21.15 % (15.51 %, 26.43 %) 7.88 8.34 20.96 (20.19, 21.73) 
6 8.76 9.20 14.69 % (8.83 %, 20.18 %) 8.34 8.79 21.27 (20.49, 22.04) 
7 9.20 9.68 -1.35 % (-5.18 %, 2.34 %) 8.79 9.23 21.03 (20.25, 21.81) 
8 9.68 10.22 9.44 % (3.43 %, 15.08 %) 9.23 9.73 19.54 (18.75, 20.32) 
9 10.22 10.97 5.45 % (-0.49 %, 11.03 %) 9.73 10.37 16.2 (15.41, 16.98) 
10 10.97 11.66 -8.5 % (-14.28 %, -3.01 %) 10.37 11.42 6.12 (5.33, 6.9) 
  5 
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Exhibits alternative operationalizations of industry  Table S14   
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Table S14. Conditional proportional hazards models with professional riskiness industry controls, full results.  Conditional cox proportional hazards 
models show that increasing STCC reduces hazard but the effect is non-linear, when accounting for professional riskiness. The dependent variable for all 
models was risk of failure at time t (hazard). Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 tests the effect of professional riskiness. Model 3 tests for 
polynomial effects of STCC, with professional riskiness as the control for industry. Industry dummies were not included in models the models, due to the 
expectation of a high level of multi-collinearity with professional riskiness.  5 
Coefficients are rounded to 4 digits, standard errors are in brackets 
 
 p<.001 unless otherwise specified 
Independent Variable Specification Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Industry = Prof. Risk 
Model 3 
Main Effect: Prof. Risk  
Entry year and quarter -7e-04 ( 0.0023 ) , p= 0.7522 -0.0014 (0.0023) , p= 0.5483 -8e-04 (0.0023) , p= 0.7215 
Mean employment per quarter in the 
past 2 years 
-0.0017 ( 2e-04 )   -0.0017 (2e-04)   -0.0013 (2e-04)   
Year Quarter dummies  Included Included Included 
Quarterly growth -6.9276 ( 0.0625 )   -6.9034 (0.0625)   -6.8509 (0.0624)   
Quarterly growth2 -3.6964 ( 0.0762 )   -3.6785 (0.0762)   -3.6366 (0.076)   
Output-per-worker -0.2092 ( 0.007 )   -0.2047 (0.007)   -0.2023 (0.007)   
Turnover  0.0053 ( 0.0012 )   0.0054 (0.0012)   0.0077 (0.0012)   
Professional Riskiness Not included 0.0025 (2e-04)   0.0026 (2e-04)   
Log STCC 
  
-0.0906 (0.0091)   
(log STCC)2 
  
0.0078 (9e-04)   
Likelihood Ratio test χ2(89)= 52960 χ2 (90)= 53168 χ2 (92)= 53325 
Summary Findings Controls predict hazard.    Increase in professional riskiness is associated with 
an increase in risk of failure.   
The relationship between log STCC and risk of failure is 
curvilinear, controlling for professional riskiness.  
 
 10 
85  Table S15 
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Table S15. Conditional proportional hazards models with NAICS four digit  industry controls, full results.  Conditional cox proportional hazards 
models show that increasing STCC reduces hazard but the effect is non-linear, when accounting for four digit NAICS coddes. The dependent variable for 
both models was risk of failure at time t (hazard). Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 tests the effects of four-digit NAICS codes. Model 3 
examines the polynomial effects of STCC with four-digit NAICS codes as the control for industry.  5 
Coefficients are rounded to 4 digits, standard errors are in brackets 
 
 p<.001 unless otherwise specified 
Independent Variable 
Specification 
Model 1 
Controls 
Model 1 
Industry = NAICS 4 Digit 
Model 3 
Main Effect NAICS 4-Digit 
Entry year and quarter -7e-04 ( 0.0023 ) , p= 0.7522 -0.0058 ( 0.0023 ) , p= 0.0127 -0.0053 (0.0023) , p= 0.0233 
Mean employment per quarter 
in the past 2 years 
-0.0017 ( 2e-04 )   -0.0023 ( 2e-04 )   -0.0019 (2e-04)   
Year Quarter dummies  Included Included Included 
Quarterly growth -6.9276 ( 0.0625 )   -6.8527 ( 0.0636 )   -6.8014 (0.0636)   
Quarterly growth2 -3.6964 ( 0.0762 )   -3.6922 ( 0.0765 )   -3.6506 (0.0764)   
Output-per-worker -0.2092 ( 0.007 )   -0.2305 ( 0.0076 )   -0.2272 (0.0076)   
Turnover  0.0053 ( 0.0012 )   0.0118 ( 0.0012 )   0.0138 (0.0012)   
Four digit NAICS codes Not included Included   Included   
Log STCC 
 
 -0.0958 (0.0091)   
(log STCC)2 
 
 0.0086 (9e-04)   
Likelihood Ratio test χ2(89)= 52960 χ2 (380)= 57055 χ2 (382)= 57199 
Summary Findings Controls predict hazard.    Four digit NAICS codes improve model fit relative to the 
other controls alone.  
 
The protective effect of log STCC is consistent, controlling 
for four-digit NAICS codes.   
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Table S16   
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Table S16.  Values of log STCC and associated with maximum hazard reduction, and increased hazard relative to organizations with zero 
STCC, controlling for industry using professional riskiness and four digit NAICS codes.  
 
Column (1) Maximum Reduction in Hazard, %: Column 1 refers to the percentage reduction in hazard between an organization with zero 
claims and one at the vertex (minimum) of the polynomial relationship between STCC and hazard of failure. Columns (2) and (3) provide 5 
the log(STCC) and the STCC at which this vertex occurs: This refers to the values of log(STCC) [col 2] and STCC [col 3] at which 
employers reduce their likelihood of failure the most by having claims, relative to an organization with no claims. 
 
Columns (4) and (5)   refer to values of log(STCC) [col 4] and STCC [col 5] above which hazard of failure is predicted to be greater than 
that of organizations with zero STCC. This refers to the point at which employers increase their likelihood of failure by having claims. 95% 10 
confidence intervals are in brackets.  
  
   15 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Max. reduction in 
hazard 
Value of STCC/log(STCC) at which 
this max. reduction occurs Increased hazard 
All organizations (prof. risk 
control) 
23.13 % (9.48 %, 
34.72 %) 
5.81 (3.8, 9.01) 332.85 (43.63, 
8179.13) 
11.62 (7.6, 
18.02) 
110788.2 
(1990.95, 
66914604.93) 
All organizations (NAICS 
4-digit dummy control) 
23.5 % (10.55 % , 
34.57 %) 
5.59 (3.76 , 8.4) 268.84 (41.94 , 
4452.04) 
11.19 (7.52 , 
16.8) 
72274.37 (1842.8 
, 19829585.96) 
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Table S17 
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Table S17. Linear regression models show that increasing LTCC increases survival, but the effect is non-
linear. The dependent variable for all models was survival, in quarters. Model 1 includes only control 
variables. Model 2 tests for the effects of professional riskiness. Model 3 tests for the polynomial effects of 
LTCC, controlling for industry using professional riskiness.  
The following control variables were included in all models: entry year and quarter, mean employment per 
quarter, age at entry, growth, turnover, and output-per-worker. Industry dummy variables were not included 
in the models.   
Coefficients are rounded to four digits and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Independent Variable Specification Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Industry = Prof. Risk 
Model 3 
Main Effect  
Prof. Risk 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Professional Riskiness  -0.095 (0.0039)   -0.1091 (0.0038) 
Log LTCC   6.6936 (0.0939)  
(log LTCC)2   -0.5432(0.0101 ) 
R2 R2 = .25, F(7, 
116597) = 5601, p < 
.001. 
R2 = .25, F(8,114982) = 
4853, p < .001. 
R2 = .32, F(10, 114980) = 
5317, p < .001. 
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Table S18 
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Table S18. Linear regression models show that increasing LTCC increases survival, but the effect is non-linear.  The dependent variable for all models was survival, in 
quarters. Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 tests for the effects of four digit NAICS codes. Model 3 tests for the polynomial effects of LTCC, controlling 
for industry using four digit NAICS codes.  
The following control variables were included in all models: entry year and quarter, mean employment per quarter, age at entry, growth, turnover, and output-per-worker.  
Coefficients are rounded to four digits and p<.001 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Independent Variable Specification Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Industry = NAICS 4- digit 
Model 3 
Main effect 
NAICS 4 Digit 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Four digit NAICS codes Not included Included Included 
Log LTCC   6.4226 (0.0884)   
(log LTCC)2   -0.4961 (0.0096)  
R2 R2 = .25, F(7, 116597) = 
5601, p < .001. 
R2 = .37, F(311,  122250) =  233 , p < 
.001. 
R2 = .42, F(308, 116296) = 275.6, p < .001. 
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Table S19 
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Table S19.  Values of log LTCC associated with the maximum survival, and with reduced survival relative to organizations with 0 LTCC.  
 
Column (1) Maximum Increase in Survival (quarters): Column 1 refers to the increase in survival time (in quarters) between am organization with zero claims and one at the vertex (maximum) of the polynomial 
relationship between LTCC and survival. 
 5 
Columns (2) and (3) provide the log(LTCC) and the LTCC at which this vertex occurs: This refers to the values of log(LTCC) [col 2] and LTCC [col 3] at which employers increase their survival time the most by 
having claims, relative to an organization with no claims. 
 
Columns (4) and (5)   refer to values of log(LTCC) [col 4] and LTCC [col 5] above which survival is predicted to be less than that of organizations with zero LTCC. This refers to the point at which employers reduce 
their survival by having claims. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.  10 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Max.  Increase in 
Survival 
Value of LTCC/log(LTCC) at which this max. reduction 
occurs Survival < 0 
All organizations (prof. risk control) 20.62 (18.73 , 22.51) 6.16  (5.78 , 6.57) 471.24  (321.11 , 711.25) 12.32 (11.56 , 13.14) 507573.3 (184315.75 , 
1546042.73) 
All organizations (NAICS 4-digit dummy control) 20.79 (18.88 , 22.7) 6.47 (6.07 , 6.91) 646.32 (430.83 , 1000.79) 12.95 (12.14 , 13.82) 419016.69 (186478.36 , 
1003577.05) 
